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The Fraud Triangle and Tax Evasion 
Leandra Lederman* 
ABSTRACT: The “fraud triangle”—a theory of why people commit fraud 
—is the preeminent framework for analyzing fraud in the accounting 
literature. It developed out of studies of fraudsters, including inmates convicted 
of embezzlement. The three components of the fraud triangle are  
(1) an incentive or pressure (usually financial); (2) opportunity; and  
(3) rationalization.  
There is a separate, extensive legal literature on tax compliance and evasion. 
The fraud triangle is largely absent from this legal literature, although tax 
evasion is a type of fraud. This Article rectifies that oversight, analyzing how 
using the fraud triangle as a lens can inform the legal literature on tax 
compliance. In addition, the Article argues that the fraud triangle can 
provide a conceptual frame that provides a place for two distinct types of tax 
compliance theories discussed in the legal literature: the traditional deterrence 
model and certain behavioral theories. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Every tax system faces the prospect of evasion, forcing governments 
worldwide to grapple with the question of how to increase tax compliance. 
There is an extensive set of literatures on this issue spanning multiple fields, 
including both law and economics. The traditional economic model considers 
tax evasion a type of gamble.1 The legal literature frequently references that 
model and analyzes deterrence.2 In recent years, tax compliance scholarship 
has also considered behavioral explanations for compliance.3 
 
 1. See Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis, 1 
J. PUB. ECON. 323, 324 (1972) (“The tax declaration decision is a decision under uncertainty.  
. . . The taxpayer has the choice between two main strategies: (1) He may declare his actual 
income. (2) He may declare less than his actual income.”). 
 2. For recent examples, see Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, The Psychic Cost of Tax Evasion, 56 
B.C. L. REV. 617, 622 (2015) (“Standard deterrence theory, as applied to tax compliance, 
assumes that taxpayers are rational actors seeking to maximize their expected utility.”); Leandra 
Lederman, Does Enforcement Reduce Voluntary Tax Compliance?, 2018 BYU L. REV. 623, 642–55 
(discussing the deterrence model); and Adam B. Thimmesch, Testing the Models of Tax Compliance: 
The Use-Tax Experiment, 2015 UTAH L. REV. 1083, 1084 (“Traditional economic or deterrence 
theories assert that the decision to comply depends on a cost-benefit or expected-utility 
analysis.”). 
 3. See, e.g., Bruno S. Frey, Deterrence and Tax Morale in the European Union, 11 EUR. REV. 385, 
389 (2003) (“[The article] seeks to demonstrate that intrinsic motivation in the form of ‘tax 
morale’ is of substantial importance in explaining tax paying behaviour.”); Dan M. Kahan, 
Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner’s Law and Social Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 
367, 380 (2002) (“The reciprocity theory not only furnishes a convincing explanation for the 
phenomenon of tax evasion; it also suggests a novel theory for combating it: the promotion  
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There is also a separate accounting literature on fraud. A central concept 
in the accounting literature is the fraud triangle, which has been called “[t]he 
dominant framework relating to fraud . . . [,] embedded in professional 
auditing standards around the world including the USA, Australia and 
international audit standards.”4 The fraud triangle is a theory of why people 
commit fraud.5 The “triangle” aspect of the fraud triangle reflects the fact that 
the theory contains three factors.6 The fraud triangle has been applied to a 
wide range of malfeasance, including student plagiarism; the Volkswagen 
emissions scandal; and Bernie Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.7 
Despite the preeminent role the fraud triangle theory plays within the 
accounting literature on fraud, it is almost entirely absent from the extensive 
legal literature on tax compliance and evasion.8 This Article both fills the gap 
in the legal literature and resolves some inconsistencies in the applicable 
accounting literature.  
This Article is as much about the fraud triangle as it is about tax evasion. 
Thus, the first two major Parts that follow this Introduction focus on the fraud 
triangle itself, while the remaining two address connections between the tax 
compliance literature and the fraud triangle. Part II begins with a discussion 
of the fascinating history and evolution of the fraud triangle. This Part also 
examines the role of experiential learning in the fraud triangle, using as an 
example the experiences of Hollywood producer and sports executive Bruce 
McNall, as described in his book, Fun While It Lasted. That is one of the 
Article’s contributions to the fraud triangle literature.  
Part III then focuses on the accounting literature on the fraud triangle. 
This Part analyzes and proposes resolutions to some confusion in that 
literature, including (1) the contested origins of the “fraud triangle” name, 
and (2) how the theory was extended from studies of embezzlement to other 
types of fraud.  
Part IV of the Article turns to the tax context, exploring how each of the 
triangle’s three factors can inform thinking about tax evasion. Part V then 
applies the fraud triangle framework to the tax compliance literature. A major 
 
of trust.”); Thimmesch, supra note 2, at 1095 (“One significant nonpecuniary model of tax 
compliance suggests a social-norm rationale for tax-compliance decisions.”). 
 4. Clinton Free, Looking Through the Fraud Triangle: A Review and Call for New Directions, 23 
MEDITARI ACCT. RSCH. 175, 177 (2015) (citations omitted).  
 5. See infra Section II.A. 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 9–10. 
 7. See, e.g., Kenneth H. Ryesky, Part Time Soldiers: Deploying Adjunct Faculty in the War Against 
Student Plagiarism, 2007 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 119, 144–46 (student plagiarism); Mandy Moody, 
Placing Volkswagen into the Fraud Triangle, FRAUD CONF. NEWS (June 14, 2016), https:// 
www.fraudconferencenews.com/home/2016/6/14/placing-volkswagen-into-the-fraud-triangle 
[https://perma.cc/NEF4-Y2NB] (Volkswagen); Walter Pavlo, Bernard Madoff is the Fraud Triangle, 
FORBES (Mar. 1, 2011, 9:28 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/walterpavlo/2011/03/01/ 
bernard-madoff-is-the-fraud-triangle/#59ea2f346cad [https://perma.cc/VW4L-BNHB] (Bernie 
Madoff); see also W. Steve Albrecht, Iconic Fraud Triangle Endures, FRAUD MAG., July–Aug. 2014, at 
1, 7 (citing such examples as student cheating, exceeding a speed limit, and cheating on one’s 
spouse). 
 8. See infra note 199 and accompanying text. 
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contribution of this Article is that it argues that the fraud triangle can serve as 
a lens that helps bridge the leading theories of tax compliance: the deterrence 
model and behavioral approaches.  
II. THE FRAUD TRIANGLE  
The fraud triangle is a three-pronged theory of why some individuals 
commit occupational fraud. The triangle’s three factors have evolved 
somewhat over the years, as discussed below.9 However, the current factors 
are generally understood to be those described in American Institute of 
Certified Public Accountants (“AICPA”) and international auditing standards: 
“Fraud, whether fraudulent financial reporting or misappropriation of assets, 
involves incentive or pressure to commit fraud, a perceived opportunity to do so, 
and some rationalization of the act . . . .”10 The AICPA adopted these standards 
in the early 2000s, in what was then called Statements on Auditing Standards 
(“SAS”) No. 99.11 The International Auditing and Assurance Standards Board 
followed suit in International Standards on Auditing (“ISA”) 240.12 Although 
the accounting standards do not specifically use the phrase “fraud triangle,” 
they are understood to refer to it.13 
A. THE FRAUD TRIANGLE’S EMBEZZLEMENT ORIGINS 
The origins of the fraud triangle lie neither with the accounting 
profession nor in the twenty-first century. Instead, Donald Cressey’s work on 
 
 9. See infra Sections II.A–.B.  
 10. CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Clarified Statements on Auditing 
Standards, AU-C § 240.A1 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2020) (emphasis added); INT’L 
AUDITING & ASSURANCE STANDARDS BD., INTERNATIONAL STANDARD ON AUDITING 240: THE 
AUDITOR’S RESPONSIBILITIES RELATING TO FRAUD IN AN AUDIT OF FINANCIAL STATEMENTS ¶ A1 
(2009) [hereinafter ISA 240] (emphasis added). 
 11. CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99, 
17 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2002). SAS No. 99 was subsequently incorporated into 
AU section 316. See Pre-Clarity Statements on Auditing Standards, AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. 
ACCTS., https://www.aicpa.org/research/standards/auditattest/sas.html [https://perma.cc/ 
W66H-TWBZ]. AU section 316 has since been superseded by AU-C section 240. See AM. INST. OF 
CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS., AU-C EXHIBIT A (2013), https://www.aicpa.org/content/dam/aicpa/ 
research/standards/auditattest/downloadabledocuments/au-c-exhibita.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
C8PC-7FSW].  
 12. Auditor’s Responsibility to Consider Fraud in an Audit of Financial Statements, INT’L AUDITING 
& ASSURANCE STANDARDS BD. (Feb. 2004) [hereinafter Auditor’s Responsibility], https:// 
www.iaasb.org/projects/auditors-responsibility-consider-fraud-audit-financial-statements [https:// 
perma.cc/4BNF-SZBN] (discussing revisions to ISA 240). 
 13. See, e.g., Albrecht, supra note 7, at 6 (“[I]n 2002, the Auditing Standards Board of the 
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants used the Fraud Triangle as a critical element 
of ‘SAS 99: Consideration of Fraud.’”); Free, supra note 4, at 177 (“The dominant framework 
relating to fraud is the so-called ‘fraud triangle,’ which is embedded in professional auditing 
standards around the world including the USA (SAS No. 99), Australia (ASA 240) and 
international audit standards (ISA 240).” (citations omitted)); David T. Wolfe & Dana R. 
Hermanson, The Fraud Diamond: Considering the Four Elements of Fraud, CPA J., Dec. 2004, at 38, 38 
(“This three-pronged framework, commonly known as the ‘fraud triangle,’ has . . . . been formally 
adopted by the auditing profession as part of SAS 99.”). 
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embezzlement in the early 1950s is generally credited as the origin of the 
theory,14 sometimes with Edwin Sutherland’s work as its antecedent.15 Cressey 
developed three factors to explain why some individuals employed in 
positions of trust violate that trust by absconding with the entrusted funds, 
while others do not.16 Cressey’s three factors were (1) a non-shareable 
pressure (generally financial); (2) a perceived opportunity to embezzle; and 
(3) rationalization of the planned violation.17  
Cressey began this work as a Ph.D. student of Edwin Sutherland’s at 
Indiana University.18 Sutherland, who “coined the term ‘white collar crime’” 
in a 1939 speech to the American Sociological Association,19 was seeking to 
overcome a common understanding of crime as committed overwhelmingly 
by members of the “lower class”20 and thus “caused by poverty or by personal 
and social characteristics believed to be associated statistically with poverty.”21 
Sutherland argued that criminality was learned behavior, rather than due to 
personal characteristics. He called the process “differential association” 
because he argued that criminality depends on the frequency with which the 
 
 14. See, e.g., Rasha Kassem & Andrew Higson, The New Fraud Triangle Model, 3 J. EMERGING 
TRENDS ECON. & MGMT. SCIS. 191, 193 (2012) (“Cressey’s fraud theory, normally known as the 
fraud triangle theory, was widely supported and used by audit professionals and standards’ setters 
as a tool for detecting fraud.”); Alexander Schuchter & Michael Levi, The Fraud Triangle Revisited, 
29 SEC. J. 107, 107 (2016) [hereinafter Schuchter & Levi, Revisited] (“This article revisits the 
Fraud Triangle, an explanatory framework for financial fraud, developed by the American 
criminologist Donald Cressey.”). 
  Throughout this Article, the term “embezzlement” is not used in a strictly technical 
sense, but rather is used to refer to any illegal misappropriation of entrusted funds. Cf. infra note 
30 (discussing how Donald Cressey addressed this issue). 
 15. See, e.g., Albrecht, supra note 7, at 1–2 (“Two individuals who probably deserve the most 
credit for the fraud [triangle] model are early criminology researchers Edwin Sutherland and 
Donald Cressey.”); Jack W. Dorminey, Arron Scott Fleming, Mary-Jo Kranacher & Richard A. 
Riley, Jr., Beyond the Fraud Triangle: Enhancing Deterrence of Economic Crimes, CPA J., July 2010, at 17, 
18 [hereinafter Dorminey et al., Enhancing Deterrence] (“The concept of a fraud triangle dates 
back to the work of Edwin Sutherland, who coined the term white-collar crime, and Donald 
Cressey, who wrote Other People’s Money.”). 
 16. See DONALD R. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY: A STUDY IN THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 
OF EMBEZZLEMENT 12 (1953) [hereinafter CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY]. 
 17. Id. at 30. 
 18. See Albrecht, supra note 7, at 2; Ronald L. Akers & Ross L. Matsueda, Donald R. Cressey: 
An Intellectual Portrait of a Criminologist, 59 SOCIO. INQUIRY 423, 424 (1989) (discussing Cressey’s 
dissertation). 
 19. Edwin H. Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality, 5 AM. SOCIO. REV. 1, 3 (1940) [hereinafter 
Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality]; see Jérémy Morales, Yves Gendron & Henri Guénin-Paracini, 
The Construction of the Risky Individual and Vigilant Organization: A Genealogy of the Fraud Triangle, 
39 ACCT., ORGS. & SOC’Y 170, 173 (2014). 
 20. Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality, supra note 19, at 1 (“The criminal statistics show 
unequivocally that crime, as popularly conceived and officially measured, has a high incidence in the 
lower class and a low incidence in the upper class; less than two percent of the persons committed 
to prisons in a year belong to the upper class.”). 
 21. Id.; see also Morales et al., supra note 19, at 173 (“Sutherland showed that criminology 
greatly underestimated (or even obscured) the violations of law perpetrated by persons of the 
upper socioeconomic class.” (citation omitted)). 
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person associates with criminal or non-criminal behavior22—an argument that 
today would likely refer to the norms of the individual’s community or 
workplace.23 
1. Donald Cressey’s Work on Embezzlement  
Cressey argued that “Sutherland’s position was confused by the fact that 
he studied corporations, rather than individual white-collar criminals.”24 To 
address that concern, Cressey focused his doctoral research on individuals.25 
He stated, “[i]t was my impression that embezzlers are white-collar criminals 
whose backgrounds are not likely to contain the social and personal pathologies 
which popular notions and traditional theory ascribe to criminals.”26  
In this research, which became a book, Cressey’s “objective [was] to 
separate, on the basis of a causal process, the behavior of trusted persons who 
violate their trust from the behavior of nonviolators.”27 In other words, he 
sought an explanation for why “some persons in positions of financial trust violate 
that trust, whereas other persons, or even the same person at a different time, 
in identical or very similar positions do not so violate it.”28  
 
 22. See Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality, supra note 19, at 11 (“Whether a person becomes 
a criminal or not is determined largely by the comparative frequency and intimacy of his contacts 
with the two types of behavior.”). 
 23. Cf. Cheryl Lero Jonson & Gilbert Geis, Cressey, Donald R.: Embezzlement and White-Collar 
Crime, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY 223, 228 (Francis T. Cullen & Pamela 
Wilcox eds., 2010) (“Cressey especially applied Sutherland’s differential association theory to the 
analysis and control of management fraud. He argued that management fraud could be 
explained through an understanding that people are exposed to definitions both favorable and 
unfavorable to the violation of law.” (citations omitted)). 
 24. Donald R. Cressey, The Respectable Criminal, 3 CRIMINOLOGICA 13, 13 (1965) [hereinafter 
Cressey, Respectable Criminal]. 
 25. JOSEPH T. WELLS, OCCUPATIONAL FRAUD AND ABUSE: HOW TO PREVENT AND DETECT 
ASSET MISAPPROPRIATION, CORRUPTION AND FRAUDULENT STATEMENTS 10 (1997). While a 
sociology graduate student at Indiana University, Cressey took a course from Jerome Hall at the 
law school, which was very unusual at the time. Donald R. Cressey, Dedication, Jerome Hall, 32 
HASTINGS L.J. 1379, 1384–85 (1981) [hereinafter Cressey, Jerome Hall]. 
 26. Cressey, Respectable Criminal, supra note 24, at 13.  
Cressey noted that the trust-violation crimes he studied did not all constitute “white-collar crime” 
as defined by Sutherland: 
As a class of crimes, trust violation cannot be considered as “white collar crime.” 
Sutherland has defined that type of crime as violation of law by persons of 
respectability and high social status in the course of their occupations. . . . While the 
crimes of trust violators are committed in the course of their occupations, many of 
the violators encountered cannot be considered as persons of high social status or 
as respected persons of the community. 
CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 184 n.9 (citing EDWIN H. SUTHERLAND, WHITE 
COLLAR CRIME 9 (1949)). 
 27. Donald R. Cressey, Why Do Trusted Persons Commit Fraud?: A Social-Psychological Study of 
Defalcators, 92 J. ACCT. 576, 577 (1951) [hereinafter Cressey, Trusted Persons]. Gwynn Nettler 
reports that it was the “moral denigration of the embezzler that piqued Cressey and against which 
his hypothesis has been advanced.” Gwynn Nettler, Embezzlement Without Problems, 14 BRIT. J. 
CRIMINOLOGY 70, 72 (1974). 
 28. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 12 (emphasis added). 
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Cressey conducted interviews with inmates in three penitentiaries (one 
each in California, Illinois, and Indiana),29 who, after apparently accepting a 
position of trust in good faith, had been convicted of embezzlement or a 
similar crime.30 Cressey’s sample included a total of 133 men.31 Because 
Cressey was not interested in the career criminal or people who had accepted 
a position planning to embezzle, he excluded from his sample numerous 
inmates who had not accepted the position of trust in good faith.32  
The method Cressey used was analytic induction, which “involves a 
researcher beginning with a set of postulates and then continually readjusting 
them so that they encompass all evidence that the data produce. Thus, if a 
negative case is found, the hypothesis is reformulated until all cases support 
the generalization.”33 Cressey states that his “formulation of hypotheses was 
guided entirely by the search for negative cases” to disprove the hypotheses.34 
Using this methodology, Cressey rejected several hypotheses as not fitting all 
of the inmates he interviewed.35 Ultimately, he phrased his summary as 
follows: 
Trusted persons become trust violators when: (1) they conceive of 
themselves as having a financial problem which is non-shareable;  
(2) have the knowledge or awareness that this problem can be 
secretly resolved by violation of the position of financial trust; and 
(3) are able to apply to their own conduct in that situation a 
verbalization which enables them to adjust their conceptions of 
 
 29. Id. at 22–23. The interviews were conducted from 1949 to 1951. Id. Cressey’s sample 
included both state and federal prisoners. See Cressey, Respectable Criminal, supra note 24, at 14 (“I 
was disturbed because my sample of embezzlers included very few bankers; this was because 
embezzlement is a federal offense and most of my interviews had been conducted in state prisons. 
So I spent a summer working in the United States Penitentiary in Terre Haute, Indiana.”). 
 30. Cressey, Trusted Persons, supra note 27, at 578. Due to differences in legal definitions, 
Cressey’s criteria for inclusion did not require that the crime constitute “embezzlement” under 
applicable law. Instead, the study focused on inmates who had “accepted a position of trust in 
good faith” and later “violated that trust by committing a crime.” CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S 
MONEY, supra note 16, at 20.  
 31. Id. at 25 (“The 73 inmates at Joliet, [Illinois;] the 21 at Chino[, California;] and the 39 
at Terre Haute[, Indiana] whose cases met the criteria were interviewed frequently and at 
length.”). Thus, Cressey’s subjects, unlike Svend Riemer’s—discussed below—were not 
specifically selected on the basis of having raised or been considered for an insanity defense. See 
infra text accompanying notes 119–20 (discussing Riemer’s case selection).  
 32. See CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 23 (stating that he screened 503 
inmates and “as expected, . . . many cases did not meet the first criterion—acceptance of a 
position of trust in good faith”). Some scholars have referred to the type of criminal Cressey was 
focused on as the “accidental fraudster.” See Jack Dorminey, A. Scott Fleming, Mary-Jo Kranacher 
& Richard A. Riley, Jr., The Evolution of Fraud Theory, 27 ISSUES ACCT. EDUC. 555, 565–66 (2012) 
[hereinafter Dorminey et al., Evolution of Fraud Theory]. This contrasts with what may be termed 
a “predator.” See id. at 565–68. 
 33. Jonson & Geis, supra note 23, at 225. 
 34. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 17. 
 35. Cressey, Trusted Persons, supra note 27, at 578. 
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themselves as trusted persons with their conceptions of themselves 
as users of the entrusted funds or property.36 
Thus, Cressey found three factors common to individuals who became 
embezzlers or similar trust violators.37 These three factors are typically 
credited with providing the origin of the fraud triangle theory.38 Cressey’s first 
factor, a non-shareable financial pressure, could involve something embarrassing 
to the individual, such as a gambling debt39 or failure of his business.40 Cressey 
considered non-shareability—the subjective inability to tell intimates, such as 
the individual’s wife41—critical to embezzlement.42 Of Cressey’s three factors, 
this one has undergone the most change over the years, as discussed below.  
Cressey’s second factor involves the perceived opportunity to commit the 
trust violation.43 Cressey argued that opportunity involved not just holding the 
position of trust but also perceiving the opportunity to convert entrusted 
funds for one’s own use.44 The trust violator may also use technical skills to 
 
 36. Id. at 577–78.  
 37. Cressey found that all three factors he identified as common to the cases were necessary 
for the crime to occur. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 31 (“The entire 
process must be present.”). 
 38. See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text. 
 39. Cressey, Trusted Persons, supra note 27, at 578. 
 40. Id. at 579–80. 
 41. See CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 28 (“[T]he specific hypothesis 
here was unknowingly suggested by a prisoner who stated that he believed that no embezzlement 
would ever occur if the trusted person always told his wife and family about his financial problems, 
no matter what the consequences.”); Donald R. Cressey, The Criminal Violation of Financial Trust, 
15 AM. SOCIO. REV. 738, 742 n.13 (1950) [hereinafter Cressey, Criminal Violation] (“None of [the 
trust violators], of course, used the words ‘non-shareable problem,’ but many of them stated that 
they were ‘ashamed’ to tell anyone of a certain situation or that they had ‘too much false pride’ 
to get help from others.”). 
 42. See CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 34, 75; Cressey, Respectable 
Criminal, supra note 24, at 15 (“Wherever a company program solves a financial problem, or 
makes it shareable, embezzlement will not occur.”). However, “[t]hirty years after his original 
research, Cressey concluded that while the unshareable problem was important, it was ‘not 
critical,’ and it was the neutralization of the criminal nature of the behavior that was his most 
salient finding.” Gary S. Green, White-Collar Crime and the Study of Embezzlement, 525 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 95, 102 (1993). 
  At least one of the cases Cressey considered seems to undermine the non-shareability 
factor. Cressey quotes Case 237, which was “[f]rom the files of a District Attorney’s Office,” as 
involving a banker whose “wife needed some medical attention of an unethical nature, and 
through a friend he got in touch with a doctor in X who” later demanded money from him. 
CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 71. In this case, the embezzler’s wife was aware 
of at least the source of the financial pressure—the “unethical” medical service. Cf. id. at 50 
(quoting Case 99 as stating, “My wife only knew about it when I got about $3,000 short.”).  
 43. See id. at 77. 
 44. Id. 
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identify the opportunity45 that “opens the doorway to fraud.”46 For example, 
in Cressey’s Case 47, an accountant stated: 
I learned all of it in school and in my ordinary accounting 
experience. In school they teach you in your advanced years how to 
detect embezzlements, and you sort of absorb it. . . . I did not use 
any techniques which any ordinary accountant in my position could 
not have used . . . .47 
The third Cressey factor is rationalization of the behavior as somehow 
acceptable48—a mental verbalization of the planned act as not really criminal 
or morally wrong.49 Cressey stated that the rationalizing thought process of 
the eventual trust violator occurred before the trust violation, allowing it to 
occur.50 Rationalization serves the psychological purpose of minimizing the 
cognitive dissonance between thinking of oneself as honest and committing a 
dishonest act.51 
Cressey further argued that “[e]ach trusted person does not invent a new 
rationalization for his violation of trust, but instead he applies to his own 
situation a verbalization which has been made available to him by virtue of his 
having come into contact with a culture in which such verbalizations are 
 
 45. Id. at 78–79, 85. 
 46. Wolfe & Hermanson, supra note 13, at 38. Wolfe and Hermanson coined the term 
“fraud diamond” by adding the fourth factor of “capability” to the fraud triangle framework. See 
id. at 38–40. They state, in part:  
Opportunity opens the doorway to fraud, and incentive and rationalization can draw 
the person toward it. But the person must have the capability to recognize the open 
doorway as an opportunity and to take advantage of it by walking through, not just 
once, but time and time again. Accordingly, the critical question is, “Who could turn 
an opportunity for fraud into reality?” 
Id. at 38–39. 
  As the discussion in the text illustrates, Cressey’s use of the term “perceived opportunity” 
seems to include the skills necessary to exploit the opportunity. However, Wolfe and Hermanson 
seem focused on somewhat different things than Cressey was. Their focus, though overlapping 
with Cressey’s, seems focused more on the repeated fraudster taking advantage of a perceived 
opportunity “not just once, but time and time again,” than on what brings a previously honest 
person to embezzle for the first time. Id. at 39. Wolfe and Hermanson also describe “capability” 
as involving attributes of the fraudster that include not only the knowledge and intelligence 
necessary to carry out the fraud, but also the skills needed to avoid detection. Id. at 40 (“[A] 
successful fraudster lies effectively and consistently. To avoid detection, she must look auditors, 
investors, and others right in the eye and lie convincingly. She also possesses the skill to keep 
track of the lies, so that the overall story remains consistent.”).  
 47. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 82. 
 48. Id. at 93. 
 49. See Cressey, Respectable Criminal, supra note 24, at 15. 
 50. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 94 (“In the cases of trust violation 
encountered[,] significant rationalizations were always present before the criminal act took place, 
or at least at the time it took place, and, in fact, after the act had taken place[,] the rationalization 
often was abandoned.”). 
 51. Sridhar Ramamoorti, The Psychology and Sociology of Fraud: Integrating the Behavioral Sciences 
Component into Fraud and Forensic Accounting Curricula, 23 ISSUES ACCT. EDUC. 521, 525 (2008). 
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present.”52 This is reminiscent of the view of his mentor, Edwin Sutherland, 
that criminality is learned, rather than inherent.53  
In searching for negative cases, Cressey stated that he examined the cases 
of the 133 men he interviewed, an additional approximately 200 case files 
“collected by E. H. Sutherland in the 1930’s,”54 and other cases that Cressey 
found in the literature. He found that all cases he examined fit the three 
criteria or, if incomplete for his purposes, did not contain information 
inconsistent with those criteria.55 Cressey quotes from multiple case files to 
provide examples of each of the three criteria.56  
2. Critiques of Cressey’s Work, and Subsequent  
Studies of Embezzlement 
Cressey’s approach has the virtue of developing a succinct theory about 
why otherwise (presumably) honest individuals embezzle. However, it suffers 
from some deficiencies, particularly when extended beyond the population 
that Cressey studied. First, the analytic-induction methodology is itself an 
issue. Most notably, it lacks predictive power, serving only to describe the cases 
 
 52. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 137. 
 53. See supra text accompanying notes 22–23. Gary Green explains: 
Cressey initially attempted to ascertain whether differential association explained 
embezzlement. The effort was understandable because Sutherland, his mentor, had 
labeled embezzlement a “white-collar crime” and had insisted that differential 
association was the most plausible explanation for all white-collar crime. While 
Cressey abandoned differential association early in his study as a root cause of 
embezzlement, he did report that his findings provided indirect support for the 
theory. 
Green, supra note 42, at 103 (footnotes omitted); see also Donald R. Cressey, Application and 
Verification of the Differential Association Theory, 43 J. CRIM. L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 43, 51 
(1952) (“While the general contention of the differential association theory, that criminality is 
learned, cannot be disputed, the more specific idea that criminality and non-criminality depend 
upon a ratio of contacts with criminal and anti-criminal behavior patterns is open to question in 
cases of crimes involving violation of financial trust.”). 
 54. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 30. Few background details are 
provided about these cases. See Marshall B. Clinard, Book Review, 19 AM. SOCIO. REV. 362, 362 
(1954) (reviewing CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16) (“[E]xactly how he used 
[Sutherland’s] material and what information was available is not clear.”). Cressey does state in a 
footnote in his book that “[c]ases numbered 1 to 200 were collected by the writer, cases 
numbered 201 to 300 were collected by E. H. Sutherland in the 1930’s, and cases numbered 301 
to 400 are from other sources.” CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 170 n.3. 
These numbers are oddly round and do not seem to correspond to other figures in the book. 
That is, Cressey states in the text of the book that his interview sample consisted of 133 inmates 
—not 200—and that Sutherland had collected approximately 200 cases—not 100. See id. at 25, 30. 
 55. Id. at 30. Some of the cases Cressey did not collect himself lacked “crucial information” 
relating to Cressey’s hypothesis. Id. 
 56. See, e.g., id. at 37 (quoting from multiple case files relating to a non-shareable problem); 
id. at 81 (quoting from two case files relating to opportunity on just that page); id. at 103 (quoting 
from a case file relating to the “borrowing” rationalization). 
A3_LEDERMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/26/2021  4:05 PM 
2021] THE FRAUD TRIANGLE AND TAX EVASION 1163 
that have already been identified,57 as Cressey recognized.58 Also, because 
Cressey did not “us[e] the more straightforward method of strict hypothesis 
testing[,] Cressey may well have forced his interpretations to fit his theme.”59 
In addition, Cressey did not interview trusted individuals who were not known 
to have committed a trust violation, to see if they shared the three factors,60 
so his study was not designed to have a control group. Instead, Cressey 
considered “[e]ach trust violator [as] his own ‘control’ since each of them at 
a prior time had been a non-violator.”61  
Second, the interview methodology means that Cressey relied on the 
inmates’ recollection of past events. It is possible that their recollections 
regarding the order of events was incorrect or distorted, perhaps in a 
systematic way. For example, some inmates may not have admitted to Cressey 
that they had also embezzled at previous times. Similarly, some inmates may 
state that they could not share the quandary with others as a post hoc 
justification of why they did not solve the problem using legitimate means. In 
other words, it is possible that, at the time of the financial pressure, the subject 
did not regard the problem as non-shareable, but rather came up with a 
solution (embezzlement) that was non-shareable.62 In addition, Cressey’s 
argument that rationalization occurred before rather than after the offense 
 
 57. Jonson & Geis, supra note 23, at 225 (“[Analytic induction] contains a major 
shortcoming from a scientific viewpoint in that it is not possible to use it for predictive 
purposes.”); see also id. (“The death rite for analytic induction was pronounced by John Laub and 
Robert Sampson in 1991: ‘No empirical research today is guided by the theory.’”); Robert 
Schafer, Book Review, 3 INT’L REV. MOD. SOCIO. 114, 116 (1973) (reviewing CRESSEY, OTHER 
PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16) (“In effect, the theory is limited to a post factum explanation of 
behavior. The reason for this lack of predictive capacity is that there is no basis for determining 
beforehand if the conditions specified as necessary for embezzlement will exist in a particular 
case.”). 
 58. See CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 153 (“The theory . . . has few 
practical implications either for prevention and detection of trust violation or for treatment of 
apprehended offenders.”). 
 59. Green, supra note 42, at 102. 
 60. See CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 22–25.  
 61. Id. at 70; see also id. at 31 (finding “as evidence of validity” that none of the cases 
contradicted his hypothesis). However,  
[t]rust violators had to report whether in the past they conceived of themselves as 
having had any other non-shareable financial problem, whether adequate 
rationalizations and the other factors were present at the time, data which would 
appear difficult to recall because they required subjective interpretations of past 
events rather than facts. 
Clinard, supra note 54, at 363.  
  Cressey also discusses a case in the literature that included consideration of the brother 
of an inmate who, like the inmate, was a bank manager, but who had not embezzled. CRESSEY, 
OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 45–47. 
 62. See Alexander Schuchter & Michael Levi, Beyond the Fraud Triangle: Swiss and Austrian 
Elite Fraudsters, 39 ACCT. F. 176, 184 (2015) [hereinafter Schuchter & Levi, Beyond the Fraud 
Triangle] (“Data acquisition in this area of research commonly takes place after the perpetrator 
has committed a crime, so one might regard retrospective reflections—even if believed by 
offenders themselves—as being contaminated by post-event processes, rather than as a ‘black 
box’ flight recorder.”). 
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may be incorrect; the inmates’ “rationalizations [may instead have] emerged 
afterward to repress feelings of guilt.”63 
Third, Cressey interviewed only inmates, so his theory was largely derived 
from trust violators who were actually caught, prosecuted, found guilty, and 
incarcerated.64 It is possible that the commonalities Cressey found would not 
be true of embezzlers who were not incarcerated.65 For example, judges and 
juries may find trust violators who had a problem of an embarrassing nature 
such that the embezzler kept it secret less sympathetic or more “guilty” than 
individuals who embezzle for a non-illicit or altruistic motive, such as to help 
an ill family member. Individuals in the latter category may thus be less likely 
to be convicted or to receive a prison sentence. Thus, Cressey’s study may 
suffer from selection bias when generalized beyond inmates.  
Fourth, Cressey’s findings may be culture-specific, reflecting the context 
for U.S. males in the early 1950s.66 One aspect that may reflect Cressey’s era 
and his focus on men is that some of his interviewees mentioned that they 
kept their financial troubles from their wives.67 In fact, Cressey’s “specific 
hypothesis . . . was unknowingly suggested by a prisoner who stated that he 
believed that no embezzlement would ever occur if the trusted person always 
told his wife and family about his financial problems, no matter what the 
consequences.”68 This obviously assumes an embezzler who is male and 
married to a woman.69 In direct contrast with Cressey’s findings, a 1974 article 
by Gwynn Nettler considering six Canadian embezzlement cases notes that in 
 
 63. Green, supra note 42, at 103.  
 64. See CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 22–25. 
 65. See Clinard, supra note 54, at 363 (“The results might be different if other samples of 
undetected violators, those discovered and not prosecuted because of restitution, etc., or those 
placed on probation were studied using his hypothesis.”). 
 66. Cf. Grace Mui & Jennifer Mailley, A Tale of Two Triangles: Comparing the Fraud Triangle 
with Criminology’s Crime Triangle, 28 ACCT. RSCH. J. 45, 47 (2015) (“[T]he Fraud Triangle is 
unique to the societal context of the USA (Czielewski, 2012), which is a consequence of its origins 
in the USA (Cressey, 1953; Sutherland, 1940, 1944).”). 
 67. See CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 71 (quoting Case 116 as stating, 
“Even my wife didn’t know.”). 
  Jonson and Geis state, “it is noteworthy that not one of the married men in the sample 
was able to share his dilemma with his wife.” Jonson & Geis, supra note 23, at 226. It is not clear 
if Cressey covered this specific issue with every married inmate in the sample, however. Also, it 
appears that at least one or two of the men’s wives knew of the financial difficulties at some point. 
See supra note 42 and accompanying text. Additionally, it is possible that the men Cressey 
excluded from the sample because they did not accept the position of trust planning to hold the 
money in trust in good faith had shared more information with their intimates. 
 68. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 28. 
 69. Some of the inmates’ wives may have been kept in the dark about their husbands’ 
finances more broadly. At least one of Cressey’s interviewees mentioned that his wife did not 
know how much he earned. See id. at 43 (quoting Case 33, “[My wife] never knew how much I 
made.”); cf. id. at 50 (quoting Case 99, “I gave [my wife] the impression right along that I’m going 
great guns. Why should I tell her and worry her about it?”); id. at 62 (quoting Case 305, “I suppose 
I should explain here, that I never bothered [my wife] with any of my troubles; after all, she was 
concerned with raising the children—she had a tough enough time of it.” (alteration in 
original)). 
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one case “the ‘problem,’ how to keep the beloved land, was not unshared. It 
was fully and repetitively discussed with the embezzler’s wife.”70 
Fifth, Cressey’s work has been criticized as focusing on “individualistic 
explanations of criminal behavior, overlooking the micro-sociological (one’s 
immediate social and organizational environment) as well as macro-sociological 
explanations (broader historical, economic, and political factors).”71 Morales 
et al. state that “Cressey’s work is thus based on a very particular conception 
of white-collar crime that marginalizes social environments and circumstances.”72 
Given the limits of Cressey’s sample and study design, Cressey’s three 
factors should not be viewed as a definitive statement regarding the causes of 
embezzlement, even when examining the problem from an offender-focused 
perspective. And in fact, Cressey regarded the project as one in search of a 
case that would falsify his hypothesis.73 Subsequent studies have found cases 
that are inconsistent with Cressey’s factors. For example, Nettler’s 1974 article 
on six Canadian cases involving large embezzlements found that “in only one 
of these six instances was it possible to construct a parallel between the 
embezzling career Cressey portrays and the facts of our Canadian cases.”74 
Nettler noted the absence of a non-shareable problem, stating, “[d]esire and 
opportunity generate theft more frequently in these instances than does a 
financial difficulty kept privy.”75 Nettler also found that “[t]hese five 
exceptions to Cressey’s singular road to fraud are more clearly described as 
individuals who wanted things they could not afford and who were presented 
with (or who invented) ways of taking other people’s money.”76 
In 1981, Dorothy Zietz published a study on female trust violators in the 
California Institution for Women.77 For purposes of comparing her findings 
with Cressey’s, Zietz excluded from her initial sample inmates who had an ex 
ante intent to steal or defraud.78 She found that the “opportunity” aspect 
 
 70. Nettler, supra note 27, at 74–75. 
 71. Morales et al., supra note 19, at 176 (citation omitted). 
 72. Id.; cf. Schuchter & Levi, Beyond the Fraud Triangle, supra note 62, at 185 (“Granted, as is 
usually the case with models, the FT does still offer an incomplete but useful abstraction of 
complex interactions, it nevertheless neglects the impact of social systems on individual decisions 
to commit fraud.”). However, the accounting standards that rely on the fraud triangle include 
the context of a pressure-filled environment as part of the “rationalization” prong. The standards 
state that “even otherwise honest individuals can commit fraud in an environment that imposes 
sufficient pressure on them.” CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Clarified Statements 
on Auditing Standards, AU-C § 240.A1 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2020); ISA 240, supra 
note 10, ¶ A1. 
 73. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 32. 
 74. Nettler, supra note 27, at 74. 
 75. Id.  
 76. Id. at 75. 
 77. DOROTHY ZIETZ, WOMEN WHO EMBEZZLE OR DEFRAUD 23–24 (1981). The initial sample 
was 100 women. Id. at 24. 
 78. Id. at 25. She considers those women separately, but it is not clear how many women 
that included. See id. at 87–123 (Part III, titled “Women Who Intended to Steal or Defraud”). 
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applied just as it had in Cressey’s study.79 However, she found differences with 
respect to the other two factors, with differences from Cressey’s first factor (a 
non-shareable problem) most substantial. For example, in some cases, the 
financial need was caused by a husband or child’s need for medical care—a 
“shareable” type of problem.80 Zietz found Cressey’s third factor, rationalization, 
applicable, but she also found that rationalizations may differ for women, due 
to gender-based norms.81 Zietz concluded that, although her findings could 
not necessarily be extrapolated to all female trust violators, she had found 
negative cases that did not fit Cressey’s three-part generalization.82 
Thus, Cressey and Zietz found somewhat different commonalities among 
the convicted embezzlers they each studied. Yet, the factors that they, as well 
as Svend Riemer, whose work is discussed below,83 found central to trust 
violations can all be characterized as consisting of (1) a financial motive;  
(2) an opportunity to commit the violation; and (3) a role for psychological 
aspects in the offender’s decision-making.  
B. “FUN WHILE IT LASTED”: THE ROLE OF EXPERIENTIAL LEARNING 
An aspect that the fraud triangle’s prongs do not specifically address is 
learning from the embezzlement experience—particularly learning that trust 
violations are not promptly detected. Cressey’s study did not focus on this 
issue, probably because his interest was in what prompted a trusted individual 
to first betray that trust.84 Some learning may lead to subsequent violations. 
That is, someone who starts by embezzling a small amount may increase it 
over time, both as financial pressures or desires increase but also as the early 
violations go undetected. 
Learning has a role in the “opportunity” element because undetected 
early violations may make the opportunity seem to continue or enlarge. With 
respect to the rationalization prong, learning that not all violations of trust 
are detected may help empower the individual to rationalize that the funds 
are not missed or that the behavior is not that bad since it is not being 
 
 79. Id. at 62. Zietz notes that “most of these women had been employed as bookkeepers, 
accountants, or clerks responsible in some way for other people’s money.” Id. 
 80. Id. at 76. In other cases, the embezzler was encouraged by trying “to retain or regain the 
affections of [her husband],” so the situational context was not kept from him. Id. 
 81. Id. at 77 (“[C]ultural ideologies affecting the development of their role models (such 
as wife, mother, and daughter) will need to be recognized as possible sources for the vocabularies 
of adjustment used by women.”). 
 82. Id. Zietz recognizes possible selection bias:  
[F]urther research is needed to determine . . . whether the results are skewed by  
the fact that many women are not sentenced to a state prison after trust violation 
(for example, women with small children, or women able to plea bargain when 
employers are reimbursed by relatives or a bonding company).  
Id. 
 83. See infra text accompanying notes 118–28. 
 84. See supra text accompanying note 28.  
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punished.85 For example, in Cressey’s Case 56, discussed in connection with 
the awareness of the opportunity, the individual states: 
I needed money very badly, and at first I didn’t think of taking it 
from company funds. . . . I sat up all one night drinking . . . . In the 
morning I . . . went down to work and took some money ($150) out 
of the safe. I reasoned that I was going to pay it back in three or four 
days, and I did pay it back. In a matter of a few days I took some 
more—it got easier as time went on. . . . The most I ever took at one 
time was about $1,000 in one twenty-four hour period.86 
In this example, the individual faced financial pressure (the first element of 
the triangle), eventually perceived the opportunity to take money from the 
safe at work (the second element), and rationalized it as a “loan” (the third 
element). The process of “borrowing” and “repaying” provided learning that 
eased the process and allowed him to increase over time the amount taken.  
The situation that Bruce McNall—a coin dealer, Hollywood producer, 
and hockey team owner who eventually pled guilty to bank fraud87—describes 
in his co-authored autobiography, Fun While It Lasted,88 provides another 
illustration. McNall’s financial troubles apparently began when the largest 
client of his business selling ancient coins, Bunker Hunt, was trying to sell a 
substantial amount of silver.89 Hunt’s difficulties had arisen because, after 
silver was selling for as high as $50 per ounce in January 1980, “[b]y early 
spring, Bunker . . . [was] committed to buy vast quantities of silver at $35 an 
ounce in a market where it was worth about $12.”90 McNall explains that when 
he 
presented [Bunker Hunt] with a list of ancient coins I thought he 
should buy, Bunker suggested a bit of creative financing that would 
help him shed more silver than the law allowed. Instead of paying 
cash for the coins, he would give me, in private, $20 million worth 
of silver that he had in storage . . . . I could sell it right away or hold 
it.91  
 
 85. The fraudster may also become desensitized to the feeling of having committed a bad 
act. Dorminey et al., Evolution of Fraud Theory, supra note 32, at 566 (“After the criminal act has 
taken place, especially if the fraud has taken place for a long period of time, the rationalization 
will likely be abandoned or cognitively dismissed. As the act is repeated, the perpetrator becomes 
de-sensitized.”). 
 86. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 90. 
 87. See Sports Executive Enters Guilty Plea, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 15, 1994), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
1994/12/15/business/sports-executive-enters-guilty-plea.html [https://perma.cc/BQ9Z-5TU7]. 
 88. See generally BRUCE MCNALL WITH MICHAEL D’ANTONIO, FUN WHILE IT LASTED: MY RISE 
AND FALL IN THE LAND OF FAME AND FORTUNE (2003) (telling McNall’s story).  
 89. See id. at 71. 
 90. Id. at 68.  
 91. Id. at 71. McNall does not express concern about financing that was apparently designed 
to circumvent applicable law. In part, that may be because of the value of the client to him. Also, 
other descriptions in the book suggest that McNall was already comfortable at that point with 
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This approach was attractive to McNall because “Bunker was working  
. . . to try to make the price go back up. He was sure that the market was just 
in a short-term dip.”92 Although Bunker did not know it, McNall did not 
actually have the coins he had suggested that Bunker buy.93 McNall decided 
to “gamble with the price of silver” and hope to make a few million dollars 
once the price rose, then acquire the coins.94 McNall explains that “I took the 
risk with Bunker’s investment because my relationship with him had grown so 
close, so familiar. I also felt comfortable doing it because I was making lots of 
money for him, especially with horses.”95  
Unfortunately for McNall, the value of silver declined to six dollars an 
ounce and McNall did not have the funds to buy the coins.96 McNall 
rationalized lying to Bunker about his possession of the coins on the basis of 
numerous favors he had done for Bunker in the past, including money McNall 
had lost97 in helping Bunker report a tax loss.98 When auditors demanded to 
see the coins, McNall, with the help of his staff, bought some of the coins on 
the list, borrowed some, and relabeled another important client’s coins.99 
Unexpectedly, the auditors took the collection McNall had labeled as 
Bunker’s, making McNall unable to return the coins to their owners as 
planned.100 McNall learned from this experience that his staff would help him 
unquestioningly:  
I was pleasantly surprised when not one person hesitated to help. 
But I was astounded when, in the end, not one pointed out that I 
had been reckless, even fraudulent, in my dealings. Later I would 
realize that they were all too dependent on me to see any other 
course.101 
 
some level of legal transgression (such as smuggling coins out of Tunisia). See infra text accompanying 
notes 103–07. 
 92. MCNALL & D’ANTONIO, supra note 88, at 71. The Hunt brothers are known to have 
“attempted to manipulate the price of silver in 1979.” Gina-Gail S. Fletcher, Benchmark Regulation, 
102 IOWA L. REV. 1929, 1939 (2017). Professor Fletcher explains that “regulators became aware 
of their schemes in a matter of months because of the observable impact it had on the price of 
silver.” Id. 
 93. MCNALL & D’ANTONIO, supra note 88, at 71.  
 94. Id. at 72. 
 95. Id.   
 96. Id. at 73. Schuchter and Levi state regarding the first element of the fraud triangle, 
“[w]hat was once a mere incentive can turn into pressure to continue.” Schuchter & Levi, 
Revisited, supra note 14, at 110.  
 97. MCNALL & D’ANTONIO, supra note 88, at 73 (“The millions of dollars I had shoveled to 
Bunker for horses; the Tunney-brokered bailout; the $650,000 I lost on that New Year’s Eve silver 
deal; all of that was in my mind as I continued to lie to Bunker about the coins I had supposedly 
bought for him after he gave me all that silver.”). 
 98. Id. at 64 (describing the New Year’s Eve transaction). 
 99. Id. at 73–76. 
 100. Id. at 76–77. 
 101. Id. at 74. 
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McNall recounted that “[r]ather than feeling chastened and humbled, [he] 
felt as if [he] had made a great escape” and “had taken a risk, and survived.”102 
In other words, McNall learned from this experience, but he felt that he 
learned the wrong lesson—he could get away with this kind of illegal activity.  
Although this series of events seems to have been where the trouble that 
eventually landed McNall in prison began, it does not appear to be his first 
transgression. He describes smuggling antique coins out of Tunisia as a young 
man, where “the removal of antiquities was punishable by a twenty-year prison 
term.”103 McNall explains that this was before most airports had metal 
detectors, so he and his traveling companion, the 16-year-old son of an 
ancient coin expert,104 “selected the most valuable ones and put them in our 
pockets, in our shoes, even in the cuffs of our pants. The rest . . . were  
. . . distributed in our luggage.”105 When asked at the airport if they “were 
transporting any national treasure,” they simply said no.106 This type of 
experience may be an early example of learning that opportunities existed for 
enrichment despite legal prohibitions.107 Thus, McNall’s story provides a 
window into how initial trust violations can provide a learning experience that 
may foster subsequent violations. 
III. MISCONCEPTIONS ABOUT THE FRAUD TRIANGLE 
Some of the origins of the fraud triangle, including the source of its 
name, are subject to differing claims. This Part examines the competing 
claims about the origins and development of the fraud triangle in an effort to 
clear up confusion in the literature. 
A. THE SOURCE OF THE FACTORS 
The source of the triangle’s three factors is sometimes disputed.108 For 
example, Professors Schuchter and Levi point to a source other than Cressey 
 
 102. Id. at 78. 
 103. Id. at 32. 
 104. Id. at 8 (describing Joel Malter); id. at 24 (referring to Malter’s 16-year-old son, 
Michael); id. at 32 (describing how McNall and Michael got the coins out of Tunisia). 
 105. Id. at 32–33. 
 106. Id. at 33. 
 107. McNall later explains in connection with another potential coin purchase: 
Like every other retailer in the world, I wasn’t much concerned with the coins’ 
origins. If you investigate thoroughly you will discover that at some point, virtually 
every ancient coin on the market was smuggled, stolen, or otherwise the subject  
of shady dealing. . . . It’s a state of affairs that is widely accepted, even by law-
enforcement authorities, and only leads to problems when questions about a sale 
become public. 
Id. at 64. 
 108. One scholar has argued that Cressey’s three factors are “loosely based on what 
policemen and detectives have referred to as ‘means, motives, and opportunity.’” Ramamoorti, 
supra note 51, at 525. Cressey’s first factor, a non-shareable problem, involves motive, and Cressey 
does list opportunity. Opportunity may also include means, although means may be more closely 
analogous to a fourth factor added by the “fraud diamond.” See Wolfe & Hermanson, supra  
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for the idea behind the fraud triangle. They state that “the original idea came 
largely from a European, Svend Riemer (1941).”109 Riemer, like Cressey and 
Sutherland, was a sociologist. Schuchter and Levi note that Cressey’s book 
cites Riemer in his discussion of opportunity, and “Riemer points out that a 
potential fraudster needs a situation, which offers an opportunity; a driving 
force in an emergency situation, which may consist of a plurality of 
environmental constellations; and psycho-pathological conditions have to be 
considered as well.”110 Schuchter and Levi “hypothesize that Cressey was 
strongly inspired by Riemer’s work when developing an initial Fraud Triangle 
approach.”111  
Cressey was certainly aware of the relevance of Riemer’s work. The 
“Review of the Literature” section of Cressey’s 1950 Ph.D. dissertation states 
that “only three sociologists have published detailed accounts of research on 
embezzlement.”112 Riemer is one of them, and Cressey summarizes Riemer’s 
article.113 In addition, although it may not be well known, Cressey and Riemer 
were colleagues on the “sociology faculty”114 at the University of California, 
Los Angeles for about a year prior to the time Cressey published the 1953 
book that grew out of his dissertation research.115 However, Riemer’s study 
—although also conscious of Sutherland’s “differential association” theory of 
crime116—had a very different focus than Cressey’s. In addition, Cressey’s 
 
note 13, at 38–40 (proposing the addition of a “capability” factor). Moreover, Cressey includes 
an additional factor, “rationalization,” which focuses on psychological aspects of the violation. See 
Cressey, Trusted Persons, supra note 27, at 578. 
 109. Schuchter & Levi, Beyond the Fraud Triangle, supra note 62, at 177 (citation omitted). 
 110. Schuchter & Levi, Revisited, supra note 14, at 108. 
 111. Id.; see also supra text accompanying note 109. 
 112. Donald Ray Cressey, Criminal Violation of Financial Trust 20 (May 1950) (Ph.D. 
dissertation, Indiana University) (on file with author) [hereinafter Cressey, Dissertation]. 
 113. Id. at 23–25.  
 114. At the University of California, Los Angeles (“UCLA”), Sociology did not become its 
own department until 1964–65. History: UCLA Sociology Chairs, UCLA COLL. SOC. SCIS.: SOCIO., 
https://soc.ucla.edu/content/history [https://perma.cc/8ZBY-GPDC]. 
 115. Cressey joined the UCLA faculty in 1950. Akers & Matsueda, supra note 18, at 424. He 
remained there until he moved to U.C. Santa Barbara in 1961. Id. Riemer joined the UCLA 
Sociology faculty in 1952, moving there from the University of Wisconsin. Ivan Light, Svend Henry 
Riemer, Sociology: Los Angeles, in UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA: IN MEMORIAM, SEPTEMBER 1978, at 
145, 146 (1978), http://texts.cdlib.org/view?docId=hb4q2nb2nd&brand=calisphere&doc.view 
=entire_text [https://perma.cc/H5TD-MD5L]. Riemer remained at UCLA until he retired in 
1972. Id. at 145. Thus, Cressey and Riemer were colleagues from 1952 to 1961. 
  Cressey conducted substantial work on his book after joining the UCLA faculty, 
including adding interviews with inmates of two additional prisons. In his dissertation research, 
“[t]he main source of direct information on trust violation was interview material obtained from 
prisoners at the Illinois State Penitentiaries at Joliet, Illinois.” Cressey, Dissertation, supra note 
112, at 40. He conducted the Chino, California interviews from October 1950 to May 1951, 
presumably after he moved to California. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 22 
–23. He conducted the Terre Haute, Indiana interviews from June to August 1951. Id. at 23. This 
was to add a federal prison. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 116. See Svend H. Riemer, Embezzlement: Pathological Basis, 32 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 411, 
412 n.3 (1942) (citing Sutherland, White-Collar Criminality, supra note 19, and stating, “[o]ur field 
of observation, however, does not permit any definite conclusions as to the validity of 
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framework grew out of interviews during which he tested and rejected the 
theories of several scholars, including Riemer.  
On the first point—the focus each scholar had—Cressey was explicitly 
interested in developing a theory regarding what factors caused a previously 
honest individual to become a trust violator.117 By contrast, Riemer’s 1942 
article, “Embezzlement: Pathological Basis,” focused on cases involving 
medical pathologies.118 The study was based on analysis of the case files of  
100 convicted embezzlers from a “prison clinic in Stockholm, Sweden.”119 The 
inmates in the prison clinic were those for whom someone had raised the 
defense of not guilty by reason of insanity.120 Based on this population, Riemer 
developed six “Socio-genetic Types of Embezzlement.”121 
Riemer begins his article by listing three factors relevant to the “conflict 
situation in which the criminal act originates”: “1) the social pull; the 
opportunity,” “2) the social push; the emergency situation,” and “3) specific to our 
material; the psycho-pathological element involved.”122 As the title of his article 
and this wording suggests, Riemer’s principal focus was on the third factor.123 
Riemer therefore considered the psychiatric classification (or “pathological 
tendencies”) of each individual.124 For example, he described some of the 
 
Sutherland’s thesis”). Two of the four citations in Riemer’s article are to Sutherland’s work. In 
addition to the one cited just above, Riemer cites to Sutherland’s textbook, along with another 
textbook. See id. at 413 n.4 (“The need of investigations into ‘behavior systems’ or ‘behavior 
sequences’ of crime has been stressed repeatedly in the methodological discussions of recent text-
book editions. Cp. E. H. Sutherland and Walter C. Reckless.”). 
 117. See supra text accompanying notes 27–32; see also Cressey, Dissertation, supra note 112, 
at 1 (“The objective of this study is the isolation and definition of the processes involved in 
violating, in a criminal manner, positions of financial trust which have been accepted in good 
faith.”).  
 118. See Riemer, supra note 116, at 411–12. 
 119. Id. at 411 n.1. 
 120. Id. (“Only such cases are transferred to the prison clinic in behalf of which insanity is 
pleaded by either defense, judge or district attorney.”). Riemer’s cases included both men and 
women. See id. at 423. 
 121. Id. at 417; see also id. at 417–23, 420 tbl.IV (listing the six types). 
 122. Id. at 411 (emphasis added). The source of the factors is not stated. See id. at 411–14. 
The terms “social pull” and “social push” are not original with Riemer. See, e.g., ARLAND D. WEEKS, 
SOCIAL ANTAGONISMS 6 (1918) (using the term “social pull”). 
 123. Riemer termed that “specific to our material.” Riemer, supra note 116, at 411; see also 
id. at 412 n.3 (noting that, due to the setting, “[o]ur attention is limited to mainly pathological 
cases”). 
  Riemer does spend a few pages discussing the other factors. With respect to 
“opportunity,” Riemer pointed to trust that can be exploited by someone engaged in a business 
transaction. Id. at 412 (“[T]he individual member of the group must to some extent be trusted 
to adhere to certain folkways concerning money transactions. These loopholes represent the 
opportunities that are open to the embezzler.”). Regarding the “emergency situation,” Riemer 
found that “[e]mbezzlement in the great majority of cases represents the only way out of an 
extreme economic emergency situation.” Id. at 414. A declining career, including risk of losing 
the family home, was a prime example. Id. 
 124. Id. at 419 tbl.III; see also id. at 416 (considering “the traditional psychiatric classification 
of reaction patterns as an additional approach to the discussion of pertinent environmental 
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embezzlers as paranoid, depressive, manic, or suicidal.125 Some he labelled as 
suffering from alcoholism in addition to another classification.126 
On the second point—how Cressey developed his theory—Cressey 
describes in his book developing a series of hypotheses based on the work of 
previous scholars. Cressey’s first hypothesis was based on his mentor Edwin 
Sutherland’s writing on white collar crime127 and was that  
the incumbent has learned in connection [with] the business or 
profession in which he is employed that some forms of trust violation 
are merely technical violations and are not really “illegal” or 
“wrong,” and, on the negative side, that they are not violated if this 
kind of definition of behavior has not been learned.128 
Cressey quickly rejected this first hypothesis because some of the interviewees 
said they did not know anyone else behaving similarly, others defined the 
behavior as theft, and some trust violators “expressed the idea that they knew 
the behavior to be illegal and wrong at all times and that they had merely 
‘kidded themselves’ into thinking that it was not illegal.”129 
Cressey then developed a second hypothesis “in part based on Riemer’s 
observation that the ‘opportunities’ inherent in trust positions form 
‘temptations’ if the incumbents develop anti-social attitudes.”130 The framing 
of this hypothesis required Riemer’s element of an emergency situation to be 
present.131 Cressey abandoned this approach “when persons were found who 
 
constellations”). Riemer stated “that [his] interest is related entirely to the ensuing distortion of 
the definition of the situation.” Id. 
 125. Id. Riemer did not find pathological tendencies in all of the subjects. See id. at 419 tbl.III 
(noting no pathological tendencies in such cases as Case 74, involving a post official, and Case 
77, involving a police officer). 
 126. Id. 
 127. This was the case despite the fact that in his book, Cressey stated that the trust-violation 
crimes he studied did not constitute “white collar crime” as defined by Sutherland because  
Sutherland has defined that type of crime as violation of law by persons of 
respectability and high social status in the course of their occupations. . . . While the 
crimes of trust violators are committed in the course of their occupations, many of 
the violators encountered cannot be considered as persons of high social status or 
as respected persons of the community.  
CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 184 n.9 (citing SUTHERLAND, supra note 26, 
at 9). 
 128. Id. at 27 (citing SUTHERLAND, supra note 26). 
 129. Id.  
 130. Id. Riemer stated in this regard:  
[T]he individual member of the group must to some extent be trusted to adhere to 
certain folkways concerning money transactions. These loopholes represent the 
opportunities that are open to the embezzler. They form a temptation if the 
embezzlers develop an anti-social attitude that makes possible an abandonment of 
the ‘folkways’ of business behavior.  
Riemer, supra note 116, at 412–13.  
 131. Cressey explained:  
The formulation was that positions of trust are violated when the incumbent 
A3_LEDERMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/26/2021  4:05 PM 
2021] THE FRAUD TRIANGLE AND TAX EVASION 1173 
claimed that while an emergency had been present at the time they violated 
the trust, other, perhaps even more extreme, emergencies had been present 
in earlier periods when they did not violate it.”132  
Cressey then shifted to a hypothesis involving the “psychological 
isolation” of a non-shareable problem, based on work by LaPiere and 
Farnsworth;133 rejected that based on interviewees’ statements; and ultimately 
formed the final three-factor hypothesis,134 for which he did not find a 
negative case. 
Thus, Cressey was influenced by prior work on white-collar crime and 
embezzlement, including Riemer’s work, but Cressey’s focus was different 
from Riemer’s. Riemer’s article focused primarily on the pathologies of 
embezzlers, while Cressey was interested in what caused a previously trustworthy 
person to commit the first trust violation. The three factors on each list share 
the “opportunity” factor, and Cressey credits “Riemer and others who have 
written on embezzlement [as] hav[ing] used the term ‘opportunity’ to refer 
to the position of trust which a person must necessarily hold before he can 
embezzle.”135  
Riemer and Cressey’s lists differ most on the third factor, with Riemer 
pointing to a “psycho-pathological element” and Cressey to a mere 
“rationalization.”136 The evolution of the factors as they were extended from 
embezzlement to contexts such as accounting fraud shares does not involve 
medical pathologies. The next Section discusses this evolution.  
B. THE FACTORS’ PATH FROM EMBEZZLEMENT TO FRAUD 
As noted above, current U.S. and international auditing standards reflect 
the teachings of the fraud triangle.137 Those standards list the factors as 
incentive or pressure, perceived opportunity, and rationalization.138 The 
 
structures a real or supposed need for extra funds or extended use of property as an 
“emergency” which cannot be met by legal means, and that if such an emergency 
does not take place trust violation will not occur.  
Cressey, Criminal Violation, supra note 41, at 741. 
 132. Id. 
 133. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 28. 
 134. See supra text accompanying note 36 (describing Cressey’s conclusions and findings). 
 135. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 173 n.1. Riemer was not the first to 
refer to the “opportunity” aspect of the crime of embezzlement. For example, a 1926 article states 
that “[t]he fundamental causes for bank defalcations are two: first, a desire for something; and 
secondly, the opportunity to gratify that desire.” William Ashdown, The Psychology of Embezzlement, 
112 BANKERS’ MAG. 519, 521 (1926). 
 136. Compare supra text accompanying notes 123–24 (discussing Riemer’s third factor), with 
supra text accompanying notes 48–49 (discussing Cressey’s third factor). 
 137. See supra text accompanying note 10. 
 138. CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Clarified Statements on Auditing 
Standards, AU-C § 240.A1 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2020); ISA 240, supra note 10, ¶ A1.   
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standards also use these three elements to help categorize “risk factors” for 
fraud.139  
The auditing standards describe the first prong as generally financial in 
nature.140 The statement regarding “perceived opportunity” for fraud is brief 
and points to an individual’s ability to override internal controls.141 Finally, 
the standards describe the “rationalization” prong as relating either to 
personal characteristics of the individual or resulting from a pressure-filled 
environment: 
Individuals may be able to rationalize committing a fraudulent act. 
Some individuals possess an attitude, character, or set of ethical values that 
allow them knowingly and intentionally to commit a dishonest act. 
However, even otherwise honest individuals can commit fraud in an 
environment that imposes sufficient pressure on them.142 
 
 139. See CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Clarified Statements on Auditing 
Standards, AU-C § 240.11 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2020); ISA 240, supra note 10, at 
app. 1. 
 140. See CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Clarified Statements on Auditing 
Standards, AU-C § 240.A1 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2020); ISA 240, supra note 10,  
¶ A1. The language generally is identical. The International Auditing Practices Committee 
(“IAPC”) and U.S. Auditing Standards Board (“ASB”) apparently worked closely together. 
According to the International Federation of Accountants the history is as follows: 
In March 2001, the IAPC issued ISA 240. In March 2001, the US ASB invited 
representatives of the IAPC to attend meetings of the US ASB’s Fraud Task Force. 
The IAPC accepted the invitation with the view to obtaining an understanding of the 
development of a revised US SAS 82 so that ISA 240 could be revised to converge 
with the final revised US SAS 82, subject to any differences necessary to take account 
of the international environment. In February 2002, the US ASB issued an exposure 
draft Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit. The IAASB issued a response 
letter to this exposure draft. In October 2002, the US ASB issued SAS 99. 
Auditor’s Responsibility, supra note 12. 
 141. CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Clarified Statements on Auditing 
Standards, AU-C § 240.A1 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2020) (“A perceived opportunity 
to commit fraud may exist when an individual believes internal control can be overridden . . . .”); 
ISA 240, supra note 10, ¶ A1 (same). 
 142. CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Clarified Statements on Auditing 
Standards, AU-C § 240.A1 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2020) (emphasis added); ISA 
240, supra note 10, ¶ A1 (emphasis added). Donegan and Ganon criticized the AICPA standards 
for what they see as an approach that exonerates the culture of the employer, stating that:  
The triangle had the . . . advantage of explaining fraud as the action of a loner driven 
by need, taking advantage of a lack of internal control. Thus . . . the search for the 
culprit could focus on individual offenders, not on the culture that may have 
encouraged and rewarded their actions.  
James J. Donegan & Michele W. Ganon, Strain, Differential Association, and Coercion: Insights from 
the Criminology Literature on Causes of Accountant’s Misconduct, 8 ACCT. & PUB. INT. 1, 3 (2008). 
  However, as the quotation in the text shows, the auditing standards’ discussion of the 
“rationalization” prong refers to fraud resulting from sufficient pressure in the individual’s 
environment. In addition, in the “incentive or pressure” prong, the AICPA focuses first on 
employment-related pressures, and only then on lifestyle pressures:  
Incentive or pressure to commit fraudulent financial reporting may exist when 
management is under pressure, from sources outside or inside the entity, to achieve 
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In the “risk factors” section, this factor is termed “attitudes or rationalizations.”143 
Regarding how these factors came to be included in auditing standards, 
several scholars explain that after high-profile accountants were convicted of 
fraud, the AICPA adopted the fraud triangle approach from the Association 
of Certified Fraud Examiners (“ACFE”).144 For example, accounting professors 
Donegan and Ganon state that, “[w]hen the AICPA belatedly recognized the 
need to consider why so many accountants were committing fraud they turned 
to the ACFE, which, in effect, meant embracing Cressey’s perspective.”145  
The ACFE was founded in 1988 by Joseph T. Wells.146 Wells was heavily 
influenced by Cressey.147 In the early 1980s, Wells had connected with 
Cressey, and Wells “ascribes much of the credit for the founding of the ACFE 
to his relationship with Cressey.”148 “The ACFE’s mission is ‘to reduce the 
incidence of fraud and white-collar crime and to assist the Membership in 
 
an expected (and perhaps, unrealistic) earnings target or financial outcome 
—particularly because the consequences to management for failing to meet 
financial goals can be significant. Similarly, individuals may have an incentive to 
misappropriate assets (for example, because the individuals are living beyond their 
means). 
CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Clarified Statements on Auditing Standards, AU-C 
§ 240.A1 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2020) (emphasis added); ISA 240, supra note 10, 
¶ A1 (emphasis added). 
 143. CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Clarified Statements on Auditing 
Standards, AU-C § 240.11 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2020); ISA 240, supra note 10, at 
app. 1. 
 144. See Donegan & Ganon, supra note 142, at 3; Mark E. Lokanan, Challenges to the Fraud 
Triangle: Questions on Its Usefulness, 39 ACCT. F. 201, 202 (2015) (“Concerned about the erosion 
of ethical standards within the accounting profession, the [AICPA] in 2002 and the [IFAC] in 
2006, followed the ACFE’s footsteps and turned to Cressey’s (1953) work on the fraud triangle 
for potential explanations of the frauds.” (citation omitted)); Morales et al., supra note 19, at 182 
(“The ACFE’s claim to expertise, [is] grounded in the imagery of the triangle, spread beyond its 
confines,” to both ISA 240 and to the AICPA in SAS No. 99). 
 145. Donegan & Ganon, supra note 142, at 3.  
 146. Morales et al., supra note 19, at 179; see also ACFE Leadership: Dr. Joseph T. Wells, CFE, CPA, 
ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM’RS, https://www.acfe.com/bio-jwells.aspx [https://perma.cc/ 
4ZEM-KLG9] (providing Wells’ biography). 
 147. WELLS, supra note 25, at 21–22 (describing his friendship with Cressey and stating that 
“although Cressey didn’t know it at the time, he created the concept of what eventually became 
the Certified Fraud Examiner”).  
 148. Donegan & Ganon, supra note 142, at 3 (erroneously referring to Wells as “Joseph 
Walsh”). 
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fraud detection and deterrence.’”149 The ACFE touts the fraud triangle as 
assisting in the detection of fraud.150 
Donegan and Ganon find “problematic . . . the generalization from a 
sample of embezzlers to those who have committed financial statement 
fraud.”151 Fraud and embezzlement are not identical. Black’s Law Dictionary’s 
first definition of fraud is “[a] knowing misrepresentation or knowing 
concealment of a material fact made to induce another to act to his or her 
detriment.”152 Fraud is thus a fairly broad category. By contrast, embezzlement 
is fairly narrow. Black’s Law Dictionary defines embezzlement as “[t]he 
fraudulent taking of personal property with which one has been entrusted, 
esp[ecially] as a fiduciary.”153 
Given this critique, it is worth examining how Cressey’s work was 
extended to financial statement fraud. Recall that Cressey’s factors were (1) a 
non-shareable problem; (2) a perceived opportunity; and (3) rationalization, 
while the fraud triangle factors adopted by the AICPA are (1) incentive or 
pressure; (2) a perceived opportunity; and (3) character or rationalization.154 
Thus, the factors that Cressey developed in his study of embezzlers were not 
simply copied over to the financial statement fraud context. The first and 
third factors changed somewhat. 
 
 149. Morales et al., supra note 19, at 179 (quoting Who We Are, ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD 
EXAM’RS, https://www.acfe.com/who-we-are.aspx [https://perma.cc/STG5-QTGW]). The ACFE 
provides anti-fraud training, and it provides a certification called “Certified Fraud Examiner.” 
Membership and Certification, ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM’RS, https://www.acfe.com/ 
membership-certification.aspx [https://perma.cc/EN8S-SHV5]. Mark Lokanan has criticized 
the ACFE’s use of the fraud triangle, in part because the ACFE has something to sell: “[I]t makes 
sense that the ACFE uses the fraud triangle because the fraud triangle validates its very existence. 
The theory here, in short, is that one’s chosen solution(s) actually specify or constitute the very 
problem that needs to be addressed.” Lokanan, supra note 144, at 207. 
 150. See Morales et al., supra note 19, at 177 (“We found a . . . tendency to generalize in  
. . . ACFE documents, suggesting that ACFE representatives are highly confident in the 
knowledge base that allegedly underlies the fraud triangle concept. . . . [T]he knowledge base 
claimed by the ACFE is presented as universal.” (footnote omitted)); see also Videos—The Fraud 
Examiner: Why Do People Commit Fraud?, ASS’N OF CERTIFIED FRAUD EXAM’RS (Aug. 2017), https:// 
www.acfe.com/content.aspx?id=4294999346 [https://perma.cc/FF3W-XNT5] (describing the 
video as follows: “Explore how pressure, opportunity and rationalization—called the Fraud 
Triangle—can come together to influence an individual to commit fraud.”). 
 151. Donegan & Ganon, supra note 142, at 3; see also Wm. Dennis Huber, Forensic Accounting, 
Fraud Theory, and the End of the Fraud Triangle, 12 J. THEORETICAL ACCT. RSCH. 28, 30 (2017) 
(arguing that “the fraud triangle . . . as originally developed and modified, has been misused, 
abused, contorted, stretched out of shape, and pressed into uses for which it was never intended 
and cannot possibly accommodate”). 
 152. Fraud, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019); cf. CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS 
& PROCS., Clarified Statements on Auditing Standards, AU-C § 240.11 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED 
PUB. ACCTS. 2020) (defining fraud as “[a]n intentional act . . . involving the use of deception that 
results in a misstatement in financial statements that are the subject of an audit”). 
 153. Embezzlement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Embezzlement does not involve 
fraud in the receipt of the property, as the property is received legitimately but in a trustee or 
fiduciary capacity. However, embezzlement involves fraud in the conversion of the property to 
one’s own use. See id. 
 154. See supra text accompanying notes 36–48, 137–43.  
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There also seems to be some confusion regarding the source of these 
changes. Morales et al. link both of these changes to Joseph Wells, the founder 
of the ACFE, stating that “[a]s in Wells’ writings (1997), the non-shareable 
financial problem has disappeared and been replaced by an incentive or 
pressure to commit fraud, while the notion of rationalization is linked with 
that of attitude, thus shifting closer to the idea of individual morality.”155 The 
cite is to Wells’ 1997 book, Occupational Fraud and Abuse.156 However, that does 
not appear to be the source of the changes. With respect to the first factor, 
Wells does not introduce the phrase “incentive or pressure.” Instead, Wells 
hews closely to Cressey in this regard. He states in part, “[t]he role of the 
nonsharable problem is important,”157 and he includes a discussion under the 
heading “Nonsharable Problems”158 after quoting Cressey’s list of three 
factors and summarizing them.159 
With respect to the third factor, Wells does not mention attitude or 
character per se, but he does say in his “Conclusion” section:  
Our sense tells us that one model—even Cressey’s—will not fit all 
situations. Plus, the study is nearly half a century old. There has been 
considerable social change in the interim. And now, many antifraud 
professionals believe there is a new breed of occupational offender 
—one who simply lacks a conscience sufficient to overcome 
temptation.160 
Thus, Wells merely alludes to developments subsequent to Cressey’s work that 
affect the third prong. 
The origins of the changes in these two prongs likely lie elsewhere, in 
research on fraud. In 1979, certified public accountant (“CPA”) Steve 
Albrecht and four other researchers conducted a study for accounting firm 
KPMG “to study fraud and how it could be detected.”161 They studied both 
 
 155. Morales et al., supra note 19, at 182 (citing WELLS, supra note 25). Morales et al. argue 
that “SAS 99 recommends calling in fraud examiners—identified as key participants in the 
antifraud effort—to work with the organizations’ administrators and auditors.” Id. at 183. 
However, it appears that the reference to certified fraud examiners appears not in SAS No. 99 
itself, see CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99 
(AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2002), but in an exhibit that Morales et al. mention, see id. 
at 76 (including a paragraph that begins, “[c]ertified fraud examiners may assist the audit 
committee and board of directors with aspects of the oversight process either directly or as part 
of a team of internal auditors or independent auditors”). Wells is thanked in the exhibit as part 
of the “Anti-Fraud Detection Subgroup.” Id. at 83. 
 156. Morales et al., supra note 19, at 194. 
 157. WELLS, supra note 25, at 11. 
 158. Id. This section spans more than two pages and includes subheadings on types of  
non-shareable problems. See id. at 11–14. This section remains similar in a related book of his, 
JOSEPH T. WELLS, CORPORATE FRAUD HANDBOOK: PREVENTION AND DETECTION 6–9 (2004), and 
subsequent editions of that book. See, e.g., JOSEPH T. WELLS, CORPORATE FRAUD HANDBOOK: 
PREVENTION AND DETECTION 7–10 (5th ed. 2017). 
 159. WELLS, supra note 25, at 10. 
 160. Id. at 20.  
 161. Albrecht, supra note 7, at 3.  
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convicted fraudsters and the existing literature on the subject and compiled 
a list of “variables that appeared to influence or be associated with the 
perpetration of fraud.”162 Their study identified 82 variables, or “red flags,” 
which they classified into three categories.163 
Based on this research, Albrecht et al. “concluded, similarly to Cressey, 
that it was the combination of three forces that produces a fraudulent act”164: 
(1) “situational pressures,” (2) “opportunities to commit fraud,”165 and  
(3) “personal integrity (character).”166 Albrecht et al. found that, in fraud 
cases, Cressey’s first element did not have to involve something non-
shareable.167 Albrecht explains: “Rather, we concluded that situational pressures 
refer to the immediate pressures that individuals experience within their 
environments. . . . We concluded that the most overwhelming pressures are 
usually high personal debts or financial losses.”168 This “situational pressure” 
factor is similar to the AICPA’s first factor, “incentive or pressure.”169 
However, the term “incentive” did not appear either in Cressey’s or Albrecht 
et al.’s first factor. For that, we have to look elsewhere.  
A very similar phrase shows up in a report issued by the National 
Commission on Fraudulent Financial Reporting (known as the Treadway 
Commission, after its Commissioner) in 1987.170 The Treadway Commission’s 
report found that: 
 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id.; cf. Marshall B. Romney, W. Steve Albrecht & David J. Cherrington, Auditors and the 
Detection of Fraud, 149 J. ACCT. 63, 65–68 (1980) (including a “fraud risk” questionnaire 
organized into five major categories). 
 164. Albrecht, supra note 7, at 3.  
 165. Albrecht et al. found that opportunities to commit fraud can involve “careless internal 
controls” on the part of the employer, but can also involve openings “individuals create for 
themselves . . . . For example, . . . [by] modifying the computer programs.” Id.  
 166. W. STEVE ALBRECHT, MARSHALL B. ROMNEY, DAVID J. CHERRINGTON, I. REED PAYNE & 
ALLAN V. ROE, HOW TO DETECT AND PREVENT BUSINESS FRAUD 37 (1982).  
 167. Albrecht, supra note 7, at 3.  
 168. Id. (emphasis added); see also Romney et al., supra note 163, at 64 (“More likely, a 
situational pressure at a personal level, such as a debt or loss, would have to be combined with a 
predisposition to partial dishonesty in order for the crime to take place.”). The “situational 
pressure” idea is similar to Riemer’s “emergency situation.” See supra text accompanying note 123. 
  Albrecht et al.’s study also  
dichotomized situational pressures into two groups: 1) those that encourage 
individuals to commit fraud for the company rather than against the company, such 
as not meeting analysts’ forecasts of revenues, gross margin or earnings, delisting 
from a stock exchange or having a cash shortage and 2) those that encourage 
individuals to commit fraud against organizations.  
Albrecht, supra note 7, at 3.  
 169. See supra text accompanying note 10. The rationalization aspect of the third factor was 
contained in Cressey’s work. See supra text accompanying note 48. 
 170. See NAT’L COMM’N ON FRAUDULENT FIN. REPORTING, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON FRAUDULENT FINANCIAL REPORTING 23 (1987) [hereinafter TREADWAY REPORT], 
https://www.coso.org/Documents/NCFFR.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y7TB-GT29]; see also 
CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Pre-Clarity Statements on Auditing Standards, AU 
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fraudulent financial reporting usually occurs as the result of certain 
environmental, institutional, or individual forces and opportunities. 
These forces and opportunities add pressures and incentives that 
encourage individuals and companies to engage in fraudulent 
financial reporting and are present to some degree in all companies. 
If the right, combustible mixture of forces and opportunities is 
present, fraudulent financial reporting may occur.171  
This report was well-received and influential. For example, the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and some of its members praised the Treadway 
Commission’s report.172 SAS No. 99 cites the report.173 Thus, the “incentive” 
aspect of the first factor may have been drawn from that report. 
As noted above, the Albrecht et al. study also shifted the third factor from 
“rationalization” to “personal integrity (character).”174 That study further 
“stated that it was easier for someone with lower or situational integrity to 
rationalize engaging in fraudulent behavior.”175 This focus on personal 
character contradicts Edwin Sutherland’s view that crime is determined by 
environment rather than by personal, moral failings. However, it is consistent 
with the AICPA’s statement that “[s]ome individuals possess an attitude, 
character, or set of ethical values that allow them knowingly and intentionally 
to commit a dishonest act.”176 Thus, Albrecht et al.’s work may have influenced 
the AICPA. 
A few years later, Loebbecke et al. developed their own three-factor 
model. Their model: 
asserts that for . . . fraud to occur, (1) the conditions of the entity must 
be such that a material management fraud could be carried out;  
(2) the person or persons who would commit the fraud must have a 
reason or motivation for doing so; and (3) the person or persons who 
 
§ 316.04 n.3 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2014) (referring to the commission as the 
Treadway Commission).  
  In trying to ascertain the causes of financial reporting fraud, the Treadway Commission 
interviewed numerous experts and “the Commission’s staff completed more than 20 research 
projects and briefing papers, including analyses of SEC enforcement actions, pressures within 
public accounting firms, AICPA self-regulatory programs, and the legal and regulatory 
environment.” TREADWAY REPORT, supra, at 3. 
 171. TREADWAY REPORT, supra note 170, at 23 (emphasis added). 
 172. See JOSEPH A. GRUNDFEST & MAX BERUEFFY, THE TREADWAY COMMISSION REPORT: TWO 
YEARS LATER 4–7 (1989), https://www.sec.gov/news/speech/1989/012689grundfest.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/LVV6-RBED].  
 173. CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Statement on Auditing Standards No. 99, 
§ 4 n.3 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2002). 
 174. See supra text accompanying note 166.  
 175. Albrecht, supra note 7, at 5. Albrecht himself subsequently changed his own view on the 
“character” point: “Over time and through conducting many more research projects, I personally 
came to agree that Cressey’s labeling of the third element as a way to rationalize the behavior as 
not being inconsistent with one’s personal code of conduct was more accurate than our label of 
personal integrity.” Id. 
 176. CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Clarified Statements on Auditing 
Standards, AU-C § 240.A1 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2020); ISA 240, supra note 10, ¶ A1. 
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would commit the fraud must be of a character that would allow them 
to knowingly commit a dishonest, criminal act.177 
In 1989, Loebbecke et al. published an article summarizing that model and 
applying it to the results of a survey of the audit partners of KPMG Peat 
Marwick.178 In this model, the third factor is “character,” in line with Albrecht 
et al.’s identification of “personal integrity” and the AICPA’s identification of 
“attitudes.”179 
Thus, it appears that auditing standards, including those adopted by the 
AICPA in 2002, built upon various studies of the causes of fraud, including 
the work by Albrecht et al. and the Treadway Commission. That research had 
moved beyond Cressey’s embezzlement-related factors. It is therefore not 
surprising that the fraud triangle factors in U.S. and international auditing 
standards differ from Cressey’s factors. 
C. WHO COINED THE “FRAUD TRIANGLE” NAME? 
Even the origin of the term “fraud triangle” is disputed. Donald Cressey 
did not use it in his writings.180 One source says that Cressey “reputedly used 
the terminology in orally-delivered remarks,” but it does not provide a 
citation.181 Morales et al. report that the AFCE stated in an email that Joseph 
Wells, its founder, originated the term with a triangle graphic he used in “a 
video featuring Dr. Cressey.”182 However, Steve Albrecht, who used the term 
in a 1991 article,183 has argued that he was the one who labelled the three 
factors the “fraud triangle,” after the “fire triangle,” when an attendee at a 
 
 177. James K. Loebbecke, Martha M. Eining & John J. Willingham, Auditors’ Experience with 
Material Irregularities: Frequency, Nature, and Detectability, 9 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY 1, 4 (1989) 
(emphasis added). Loebbecke, Eining, and Willingham argued that if any one of the three factors 
is not present, material management fraud will not occur. Id. at 5 fig.1. 
 178. Id. at 4–5, 15–19 tbl.9.  
 179. See supra text accompanying notes 143, 166. 
 180. Schuchter & Levi, Beyond the Fraud Triangle, supra note 62, at 177 n.5. 
 181. Ryesky, supra note 7, at 144 n.154. 
 182. See Morales et al., supra note 19, at 177. They explain: 
We contacted the ACFE by email concerning the origins of this term and received 
the following response from an ACFE representative:  
Dr. Cressey developed the three items, but he did not call it the Fraud 
Triangle. Actually, Dr. Wells is the first person we know of to take the three 
items and put [them] in a triangle format. He was working on a video 
featuring Dr. Cressey in 1985, and he used a triangle graphic in the video to 
illustrate the 3 factors that are present in most white-collar offenses. He began 
using the triangle graphic in training programs after that time. People saw the 
graphic and began referring to it as the Fraud Triangle over the years. So 
although we have never undertaken an extensive review of its use, as far as we 
know, that’s how it came about. 
Id. (alteration in original) (quoting E-mail from an ACFE representative (May 27, 2011)).  
 183. W. Steve Albrecht, Fraud in Government Entities: The Perpetrators and the Types of Fraud, 7 
GOV’T FIN. REV. 27, 27 (1991). 
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seminar Albrecht gave at a paper company suggested that the two concepts 
are similar.184  
The label “fraud triangle” makes more sense when applied to Albrecht’s 
work than to Cressey’s. Cressey focused on embezzlement and similar trust 
violations,185 while Albrecht and his co-authors studied the causes of fraud.186 
Morales et al. observe that “Cressey (1953) does not stress the word ‘fraud’ in 
his book; the index indicates only one page in which ‘fraudulent checks’ is 
found, while ‘embezzlement’ is found on 24 pages.”187 
Some sources refer to it as “Cressey’s fraud triangle”188 or say that Cressey 
developed the fraud triangle to explain the causes of fraud.189 However, those 
sources overlook some of the relevant history. Cressey’s study focused on 
embezzlement, and his three factors underwent revisions before they were 
reflected in auditing standards.190 It makes sense that the factors were given a 
name that refers to fraud after they were adapted to the fraud context. 
 
 184. Albrecht, supra note 7, at 5. Albrecht adds, “I even included quotation marks around 
the term because I hadn’t heard it used before.” Id. at 6.  
  The fire analogy may have caused some confusion. On the one hand, Albrecht wrote in 1991: 
The fraud triangle is very much like the “fire triangle.” In order to have a fire, three 
conditions must exist: there must be oxygen, heat and fuel. If any one of these is 
removed, there will be no fire. Likewise with fraud: if either the pressure, 
opportunity or rationalization is removed, fraud does not occur. 
Albrecht, supra note 183, at 27. This is consistent with Cressey’s argument. See CRESSEY, OTHER 
PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 139 (“[T]he absence of any of these [three] events will 
preclude violation.”). On the other hand, Albrecht and his co-authors of the 1979 study found 
that even if two elements are missing, fraud could occur if the other element is strong enough. 
See Albrecht, supra note 7, at 4–5. Schuchter and Levi found in interviews that it was not necessary 
for all three elements to be present, and they “strongly suggest that a distinction must be made” 
between the mechanisms of the fraud triangle and the fire triangle. Schuchter & Levi, Revisited, 
supra note 14, at 109. 
 185. See Huber, supra note 151, at 31 (arguing that the fraud triangle should be renamed the 
“embezzlement triangle” and that it has no application to fraud). 
 186. See Albrecht, supra note 7, at 3 (stating that Cressey “never drew or referred to [the 3 
elements] as a triangle nor used the term ‘fraud triangle.’ He also limited his discussion to 
embezzlement and not to fraud in general.”). 
 187. Morales et al., supra note 19, at 176 (citation omitted). However, an article published 
prior to Cressey’s book and discussing some of the same material was called Why Do Trusted Persons 
Commit Fraud?: A Social-Psychological Study of Defalcators. See Cressey, Trusted Persons, supra note 27.  
 188. See, e.g., John D. Gill, The Fraud Triangle on Trial, FRAUD MAG., Sept.–Oct. 2017, at 18, 19 
(stating in the abstract, “Dr. Donald Cressey’s fraud triangle has endured”); P. Ravisankar, V. 
Ravi, G. Raghava Rao & I. Bose, Detection of Financial Statement Fraud and Feature Selection Using Data 
Mining Techniques, 50 DECISION SUPPORT SYS., 491, 492 (2011) (“The fraud triangle is also known 
as Cressey’s Triangle, or Cressey’s Fraud Triangle.”). 
 189. See, e.g., Rabi’u Abdullahi, Noorhayati Mansor & Muhammad Shahir Nuhu, Fraud 
Triangle Theory and Fraud Diamond Theory: Understanding the Convergent and Divergent for Future 
Research, 12 EUR. J. BUS. & MGMT. 30, 30 (2015) (“Cressey (1950) focused his research on the 
factors that lead individuals to engage in fraudulent and unethical activity.”); Schuchter & Levi, 
Revisited, supra note 14, at 107 (“This article revisits the Fraud Triangle, an explanatory 
framework for financial fraud, developed by the American criminologist Donald Cressey.”). 
 190. See Gregory M. Trompeter, Tina D. Carpenter, Naman Desai, Keith L. Jones & Richard 
A. Riley, Jr., A Synthesis of Fraud-Related Research, 32 AUDITING: J. PRAC. & THEORY, supp. 1, 2013, 
at 287, 291 (“Although initially developed by Cressey (1950) to explain embezzlement, 
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IV. APPLYING THE FRAUD TRIANGLE TO TAX EVASION 
Although the fraud triangle was developed in the context of certain types 
of malfeasance, its three factors—(1) an incentive or perceived (usually 
financial) pressure; (2) a perceived opportunity to cheat; and (3) rationalization 
of the planned action—could also apply to other kinds of fraudulent activity. 
For example, one article applied it to the Libor manipulation scandal.191 Steve 
Albrecht has argued that the fraud triangle can apply to any kind of 
“compromise.”192 
While there are questions about how far the fraud triangle can extend,193 
applying it as a lens on tax evasion is not a big stretch. First, tax evasion is  
a type of fraud.194 Second, the fraud triangle often focuses on an individual 
acting alone, although it has been extended to collusive activity.195 Tax 
evasion need not involve collusion. For example, it can occur in the context 
 
researchers and regulators have expanded the fraud triangle model to incorporate fraudulent 
financial reporting. Consistent with this, they have broadened the language to include ‘pressure’ 
and ‘incentive.’”(quoting CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Statement on Auditing 
Standards No. 99 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2002))). 
 191. See Mark Lokanan & Satish Sharma, A Fraud Triangle Analysis of the Libor Fraud, 10 J. 
FORENSIC & INVESTIGATIVE ACCT. 187, 187 (2018). For a description of the Libor scandal, see 
James McBride, Understanding the Libor Scandal, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELS. (Oct. 12, 2016), 
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/understanding-libor-scandal [https://perma.cc/F7XB-
4V2B]. 
 192. Albrecht, supra note 7, at 7 (“Whether it’s fraud or any other type of compromise, the 
same three elements—perceived pressure, perceived opportunity and some way to rationalize the 
compromise as not being inconsistent with one’s code of conduct—are always present.”). 
 193. For example, Donegan and Ganon argued that “even if Cressey’s findings for 
embezzlers were valid, there is little evidence to support the fraud triangle as a general theory of 
financial crime.” Donegan & Ganon, supra note 142, at 3. By contrast, Schucter and Levi, who 
found that their cases did not all fit Cressey’s three-factor generalization, concluded that “the 
Fraud Triangle does not lose its importance; rather the coercive ‘must be’ for every element has 
to be replaced by ‘can be’ or ‘almost always is.’” Schuchter & Levi, Revisited, supra note 14, at 118. 
Although discussing these studies in detail is outside the scope of this Article, it is worth noting 
that several scholars have conducted empirical studies testing the three factors in the accounting 
standards as predictors of fraud. See, e.g., Lokanan & Sharma, supra note 191, at 197–98; Yung-I 
Lou & Ming-Long Wang, Fraud Risk Factor of the Fraud Triangle Assessing the Likelihood of Fraudulent 
Financial Reporting, J. BUS. & ECON. RSCH., Feb. 2009, at 61, 61–62; Christopher J. Skousen, Kevin 
R. Smith & Charlotte J. Wright, Detecting and Predicting Financial Statement Fraud: The Effectiveness 
of the Fraud Triangle and SAS No. 99, in 13 ADVANCES IN FINANCIAL ECONOMICS: CORPORATE 
GOVERNANCE AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 53–81 (Mark Hirschey et al. eds., 2009). 
 194. Emily Tuner, Chad Albrecht, Conan Albrecht & Victor Morales Rocha, A Historical View 
of the Walter Anderson Tax Evasion Scheme, J. TAX’N, May 2018, at 7, 7 (“Fraud has often been 
described as the process of using dishonest methods to take, or misrepresent, something of value, 
often money or other resources, from another person or organization. Under this definition, tax 
evasion is a particular type of fraud involving the illegal nonpayment or underpayment of tax.” 
(footnote omitted)); Doreen McBarnet, Whiter than White Collar Crime: Tax, Fraud Insurance and 
the Management of Stigma, 42 BRIT. J. SOCIO. 323, 323 (1991) (“Tax evasion is a term usually 
reserved for non-payment of tax by means of criminal fraud or other violations of law.”). 
 195. Free, supra note 4, at 185. Free observes that “the major frauds of recent decades, 
including Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat, HealthSouth and Satyam, all illustrate that collusion is a 
central element in many complex and costly frauds and financial crimes.” Id. 
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of an individual self-preparing an annual tax return or lying to a tax 
preparer.196  
Third, the origins of the fraud triangle lie in studies of embezzlers. Tax 
fraud is not identical to embezzlement, as the funds a taxpayer receives may 
begin as one’s own (e.g., as payment for services or property), rather than in 
trust for another party, but the two concepts share the central aspect of 
conversion of funds that rightfully belong to another.197 Cressey actually used 
tax evasion as the opening example in an article focusing primarily on 
embezzlement.198 The fraud triangle has also evolved to encompass frauds 
that are further removed from embezzlement, such as financial statement 
fraud, which entails fraud on behalf of a third-party organization. 
Although a handful of scholars have applied the fraud triangle to tax 
fraud, generally in brief treatments,199 the legal literature on tax compliance 
and evasion generally does not mention the fraud triangle. A short article in 
 
 196. Tax preparers can also collude in tax evasion, though that behavior likely occurs only 
in a small part of the tax preparer market. See Susan Cleary Morse, Stewart Karlinsky & Joseph 
Bankman, Cash Businesses and Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 37, 59 (2009) (“The majority 
of cash business preparers were people like B [an anonymous accountant], who suspected his 
clients of tax evasion and refused to help his clients cheat, but did not investigate further or make 
serious attempt to limit the cheating. A much smaller set of preparers seemed to go much farther 
and actively assist tax evasion.”). Some tax preparers may simply avoid asking about things such 
as “cash income, so as to permit the tax preparer to avoid the uncomfortable question of whether 
to participate in what is plainly an evasion scheme.” Id. at 43. 
 197. One article argued that “[i]n most situations, tax evasion can be viewed as embezzlement 
of government funds. The fraud triangle is particularly applicable to embezzlement because 
Cressey’s original study used embezzlers as subjects.” James A. Tackett, Joe Antenucci & Fran 
Wolf, A Criminological Perspective of Tax Evasion, 110 TAX NOTES 654, 655 (2006). 
 198. See Cressey, Respectable Criminal, supra note 24, at 13 (opening the article as follows: 
“Spring has returned, and with it two of the major themes of strategy in American life—how to 
win a baseball pennant and how to beat the income tax collector.”). 
 199. See, e.g., Dorminey et al., Evolution of Fraud Theory, supra note 32, at 563 (mentioning tax 
evasion as an example); Todd Haugh, Overcriminalization’s New Harm Paradigm, 68 VAND. L. REV. 
1191, 1226 (2015) (discussing as an example “one of Cressey’s ‘respectable’ criminals: the tax 
cheat,” but not using the term “fraud triangle”); Michael Pickhardt & Aloys Prinz, Behavioral 
Dynamics of Tax Evasion—A Survey, J. ECON. PSYCH., Feb. 2014, at 1, 12 (combining “Cressey’s 
(1953) ‘fraud triangle’ . . . with the Mazar et al. (2008) and Ariely (2012) approach which is 
called here ‘fudge triangle’”); Grant Richardson, Grantley Taylor & Christopher S. Wright, 
Corporate Profiling of Tax-Malfeasance: A Theoretical and Empirical Assessment of Tax-Audited Australian 
Firms, 12 EJOURNAL TAX RSCH. 359 (2014) (applying the fraud triangle to a set of Australian 
firms’ tax reporting to identify badges of tax malfeasance); Tackett et al., supra note 197 
(discussing the criminology of tax evaders using the fraud triangle approach); Tuner et al., supra 
note 194, at 7 (applying the fraud triangle primarily to a specific tax evasion case). None of the 
authors of these articles appear to be on law faculties. Most appear to be business school or 
accounting professors. 
  The author of this Article also authored a blog post applying to tax evasion both the 
fraud triangle and the four-factor version called the fraud diamond. See generally Leandra 
Lederman, Tax Evasion and the Fraud Diamond, SURLY SUBGROUP (Dec. 18, 2018), https:// 
surlysubgroup.com/2018/12/18/tax-evasion-and-the-fraud-diamond [https://perma.cc/F3NM 
-HKMV]. 
A3_LEDERMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/26/2021  4:05 PM 
1184 IOWA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 106:1153 
Tax Notes authored by three CPAs engages in perhaps the most comprehensive 
application of the fraud triangle’s three factors to tax evasion.200  
In that article, Tackett et al. briefly apply each factor to tax evasion. They 
label the first factor only as pressure—not incentive—and they explain that 
someone may feel financial pressure regarding the tax liability.201 They 
further argue that the costs of complying with the tax laws may cause 
psychological pressure and additional financial pressure.202 They briefly 
discuss the second element (opportunity), using a metaphor of a department 
store that functions on the honor system—implying, as discussed below,203 
that lack of monitoring and sanctions for wrongdoing would soon put the 
store out of business.204 With respect to the third factor (rationalization), 
Tackett et al. provide three possible types of rationalizations for tax evasion.205 
Each of the three elements of the fraud triangle also has additional aspects 
when applied to tax evasion, and is examined, in turn, below.  
A. FINANCIAL PRESSURE OR INCENTIVE 
Financial pressure and incentive are two distinct possible motivators  
for tax evasion. Financial pressure that can be relieved by tax evasion can 
occur in a variety of contexts. One such context involves small businesses. A 
business owner who employs workers is required to withhold income and 
employment taxes from the employees’ paychecks and remit those taxes to 
the government.206 Under the Internal Revenue Code, these taxes are “held 
to be a special fund in trust for the United States.”207 It is well known that 
struggling small businesses may fail to remit these “trust fund taxes.”208 This is 
 
 200. See generally Tackett et al., supra note 197 (using the fraud triangle as a focal point for 
arguing that its framework helps better identify possible tax evaders). 
 201. Id. at 655.  
 202. Id. at 655–56. 
 203. See infra text accompanying notes 292–93 (critiquing the “honor system” metaphor). 
 204. Tackett et al., supra note 197, at 656 (discussing the “opportunity” element in two 
paragraphs, referring to “a department store operat[ing] on the honor system . . . without any 
supervision other than a 1 percent chance of being audited,” with almost no likelihood of 
prosecution and only a small fine if caught, and positing: “How long would such a store remain 
in business? The scenario is analogous to the federal income tax system.”).  
 205. See id. 
 206. I.R.C. §§ 3101–3102 (2018) (employment taxes); id. §§ 3402–3403 (income taxes). 
 207. Id. § 7501(a). 
 208. Lawrence J. Gregory, Trust Fund Taxes: Personal Liability for Small Business Owners in 
Economic Decline, 25 DCBA BRIEF, Nov. 2012, at 16, 17 (“A small business may be suffering for 
some time. . . . [O]wners may stop remitting employment tax withholding as a way to free up 
some extra cash, paying their suppliers instead.”); see U.S. GEN. ACCT. OFF., GAO-02-92, TAX 
ADMINISTRATION: IRS’S EFFORTS TO IMPROVE COMPLIANCE WITH EMPLOYMENT TAX REQUIREMENTS 
SHOULD BE EVALUATED 1 (2002) (“When confronted with a choice between paying necessary 
operating expenses or depositing employment taxes, struggling businesses may opt to pay 
business expenses instead of taxes.”); Am. Bar Ass’n Comm’n on Taxpayer Compliance, Report 
and Recommendations on Taxpayer Compliance, 41 TAX LAW. 329, 367 (1987) (“It is tempting for 
the business owner in such desperate straits to view employee tax withholdings as an interest-free 
loan that will be paid back once business turns around.”); T. Keith Fogg, In Whom We Trust, 43 
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closely analogous to embezzlement and similar violations of financial trust.209 
The “financial pressure” element of the fraud triangle may help explain why 
a business owner could operate for a long time properly remitting trust fund 
taxes but begin to convert those funds for the business’s use when faced with 
financial difficulties that threaten the business’s existence. 
Trust fund tax enforcement is distinct and carries a special tax penalty.210 
A better-known tax compliance context involves an individual preparing an 
annual return.211 A taxpayer who owes tax but is facing financial pressures 
could be inclined to cheat so as to reduce the amount owed or produce a 
larger tax refund. This may or may not involve a tax preparer.212 The tax 
liability itself can also create financial pressure.213 
Even absent financial pressure, the lure of saving money provides an 
incentive to cheat. For example, in the annual return-preparation context, 
even if an individual faces no special external financial pressure, and even if 
the tax liability itself does not create pressure (e.g., because the taxpayer is 
due a tax refund), the possibility of being able to pocket extra money does 
provide a financial incentive.214  
In the corporate context, “[d]eclaring large profits—and even better, 
large after-tax profits—is often viewed as a signal of superior performance.”215 
The corporation’s owners are the direct beneficiaries of a reduction in tax 
 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 357, 361 (2010) (“Non-compliance with payment of collected taxes generally 
occurs with small businesses and not with large ones. . . . The failure rate of these businesses is 
high . . . . The federal tax obligation that impacts them most is the employment tax liability . . . .” 
(footnotes omitted)). 
 209. Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 971, 1006 
–07 (2003) [hereinafter Lederman, Reformed IRS] (“Often it is failing businesses that do not pay 
over the taxes, essentially embezzling them as a way to forestall closing down.”). 
 210. See I.R.C. § 6672(a) (“Any person required to collect, truthfully account for, and pay 
over any tax imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or truthfully account for 
and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to evade or defeat any such tax or the 
payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable to a penalty equal 
to the total amount of the tax evaded, or not collected, or not accounted for and paid over.”).  
 211. Some individuals also are required to make quarterly estimated tax payments. See IRS, 
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK, 2017, at 4 tbl.2 (2018), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
soi/17databk.pdf [https://perma.cc/2DRZ-37VF] (showing that in 2017, 22,230,026 estimated 
income tax returns were filed). 
 212. See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
 213. See Tackett et al., supra note 197, at 656 (“[T]he pressure element of the fraud triangle 
in tax evasion consists of the financial pressure of paying the tax along with the financial and 
psychological pressure (that is, resentment) of compliance with the tax laws.”). 
 214. Cf. Jerry L. Mills, What to Do When the Boss Is a Tax Evader, CFO (Aug. 25, 2014), https:// 
www.cfo.com/tax/2014/08/boss-tax-evader [https://perma.cc/PG4X-V69L] (“The higher the 
effective tax burden, the more is the temptation . . . for business owners to use aggressive methods 
to lower their tax payments.”). 
 215. Graeme S. Cooper, Analyzing Corporate Tax Evasion, 50 TAX L. REV. 33, 75 (1994). 
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liability.216 This may, in turn, translate to pressure on employees.217 In the 
context of legal tax avoidance, Mihir Desai and Dhammika Dharmapala 
argue, “[e]ssentially, shareholders want managers to avoid taxes, and managers, 
once their incentives are sufficiently aligned, engage in tax avoidance.”218 
Incentives may become aligned through incentive-based compensation.219  
For example, “[t]o align incentives, it may be appropriate for the tax officer’s 
salary to depend (inversely) on the effective tax rate achieved.”220  
Corporate tax reduction may not stop with legal tax avoidance 
strategies.  
Both avoidance and evasion are rooted in the same desire—to 
minimize the corporation’s total tax liability, not at all costs, but up 
to the point where the marginal costs of additional efforts to reduce 
the tax liability equal the marginal tax saving. 
 . . . . 
 
 216. Id. at 77 (“It is in the shareholders’ interests for the managers to seek to reduce the size 
and number of competing claimants (such as the revenue authority) on the corporation’s 
assets.”); Michelle Hanlon & Joel Slemrod, What Does Tax Aggressiveness Signal? Evidence from Stock 
Price Reactions to News About Tax Shelter Involvement, 93 J. PUB. ECON. 126, 126 (2009) (“[I]n order 
to maximize the value of the firm, shareholders would like to minimize corporate tax payments 
net of the private costs of doing so . . . .”). 
 217. See Keith J. Crocker & Joel Slemrod, Corporate Tax Evasion with Agency Costs, 89 J. PUB. 
ECON. 1593, 1595 (2005) (stating, in 2005, that “[t]here [wa]s abundant evidence that the focus 
of corporate tax departments has changed from that of passive compliance with the tax laws to 
active, aggressive, and often arguably illegal tax planning”); id. (“Of the various measures used to 
evaluate the performance of tax departments, the most often cited was the savings, or value 
added, they provided: 86% cited this performance measure . . . . Of those 86%, 63% said that 
this measure affected the compensation of tax department personnel.”).  
  The employees may also be shareholders, in which case they directly benefit from an 
increase in the value of the corporation: 
[T]he apparent divergence between owners and managers may not be significant 
where the corporation’s managers have already become the partial owners of the 
corporation. . . . The paradigm example is the privately held corporation where 
there is little separation of ownership from management. But even in publicly held 
corporations, it is common for the remuneration of the corporation’s managers to 
be tied to their efforts to enhance the market value of the corporation through share 
and option allotment schemes. 
Cooper, supra note 215, at 80. 
 218. Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Earnings Management, Corporate Tax Shelters, 
and Book—Tax Alignment, 62 NAT’L TAX J. 169, 171 (2009).  
 219. Sonja Olhoft Rego & Ryan Wilson, Equity Risk Incentives and Corporate Tax Aggressiveness, 
50 J. ACCT. RSCH. 775, 779 (2012) (“[R]isk‐averse managers must be properly incentivized to 
undertake risky tax strategies that generate net benefits for the firm and its shareholders. Our 
results suggest that equity risk incentives provide managers such incentives.”); see also Mihir A. 
Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Corporate Tax Avoidance and High-Powered Incentives, 79 J. FIN. 
ECON. 145, 149 (2006) (“The tremendous growth in incentive compensation during the 1990s 
coincided with an increased disconnect between the profits reported to capital markets and the 
profits reported to tax authorities.”); cf. Dorminey et al., Enhancing Deterrence, supra note 15, at 21 
(“With financial reporting fraud, the first leg of the fraud triangle has been adjusted from 
pressure to focus on motivators such as monetary incentives, bonuses, or stock options.”). 
 220. Crocker & Slemrod, supra note 217, at 1595. 
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 . . . At some point it is quite conceivable that the corporation’s 
managers will substitute evasion for further avoidance . . . .221 
More generally, “managers may be prepared to engage in evasion because 
they have been effectively motivated to further the shareholders’ interests, or 
because they believe evasion will further their own interests.”222  
Of course, corporate tax evasion, which is illegal, has costs, including 
risks to employees. One such risk is possible criminal sanctions: “Corporate 
managers might be implicated in such offenses as attempting to evade the 
corporate tax, aiding or abetting tax evasion by the corporation, conspiring 
to defraud the government through tax evasion, failing to file tax returns, or 
making false statements to the revenue authority in tax returns.”223 However, 
employees may disregard this risk if they believe that the likelihood that tax 
fraud will result in personal or criminal liability is incredibly small.224  
Another risk to employees is possible termination of employment if the 
government detects the evasion.225 However, employees may believe that it is 
unlikely that tax fraud will be detected.226 Moreover, “[a]lthough termination 
is a serious penalty, the threat of job loss provides limited deterrence when 
the individual deciding whether to commit fraud believes that her job is on 
the line anyway.”227 In short, if the pressures on corporate employees and/or 
financial incentives outweigh the expected costs, that dynamic can prompt tax 
evasion, even if the incentive structure was not intentionally designed for that 
purpose.228 
Thus, incentives and pressures can both be factors in tax fraud. The 
evolution of the first factor in Cressey’s research to the fraud triangle’s 
 
 221. Cooper, supra note 215, at 87–88.  
 222. Id. at 79–80. 
 223. Graeme S. Cooper, The Return to Corporate Tax Evasion in the Presence of an Income Tax on 
Shareholders, 12 AKRON TAX J. 1, 8–9 (1996) (footnotes omitted).  
 224. Id. at 9 (stating that a corporate manager might “belie[ve] that the imposition of 
personal liability is so unlikely that he may treat the prospect of punishment as negligible”); 
Cooper, supra note 215, at 83 (“Administrative practices, preferring the imposition of civil fines 
on the corporation to prosecution of individuals for fraud, may support this perception that 
evasion carries no real threat of individual punishment.”). 
 225. See Urska Velikonja, Leverage, Sanctions, and Deterrence of Accounting Fraud, 44 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 1281, 1299 (2011) (stating that employees “caught [committing fraud] might lose their 
job (e.g., nine out of ten managers named in SEC or Department of Justice (‘DOJ’) enforcement 
actions for fraud did indeed lose their jobs)”). 
 226. See Cooper, supra note 215, at 96 (“It is possible that evasion will not be detected, 
especially if steps are taken by the corporation to conceal its behavior; [and] some detected errors 
will be ‘deniable’ in the sense that they may be successfully represented as innocent mistakes or 
avoidance . . . .”); Velikonja, supra note 225, at 1299 (“[N]ot all fraud is discovered, and not all 
discovered fraud is subject to an enforcement action.”). 
 227. Velikonja, supra note 225, at 1299–1300.  
 228. Cooper, supra note 215, at 79 (“[I]t may be that the shareholders have introduced 
incentive structures . . . which, although implemented for more general purposes, are effective 
to overcome the managers’ reluctance to become involved in evasion.”); see also Crocker & 
Slemrod, supra note 217, at 1594 (“The incentives of the CFO to engage in tax evasion are 
affected by the nature of her compensation arrangement.”).  
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“pressure or incentive” helps expand the scope of the fraud triangle to the 
various contexts in which tax evasion may occur. 
B. PERCEIVED OPPORTUNITY TO EVADE 
The second, and most constant, fraud triangle factor is “perceived 
opportunity,” sometimes just referred to as “opportunity.”229 Tackett et al. 
remark that “[i]f opportunity is not present, fraud is impossible.”230 Morales 
et al. stated about Cressey’s concept of opportunity, “[o]f [Cressey’s] three 
conditions, the most evident (to the point where it may seem tautological) is 
that of perceived opportunity: if a person commits an act, then he or she must 
necessarily have perceived the possibility to do so.”231 The same holds for tax 
evasion. That is, tax evasion necessarily involves some kind of perceived 
opportunity to evade. 
In the individual income tax context, some taxpayers have more 
opportunity to evade taxes than others. For example, it is easier to successfully 
evade taxes with respect to cash income than with respect to items that have a 
paper trail.232 Accordingly, the opportunity to evade can be reduced through 
the use of third-party reporting of taxes, such as on Form W-2 or 1099, and/or 
withholding, such as occurs in the employment context.233   
Withholding involves retention of a tax amount before it is ever paid to 
the taxpayer, decreasing the taxpayer’s opportunity to avoid paying it over234 
 
 229. See, e.g., Tackett et al., supra note 197, at 655 (“The fraud triangle hypothesizes that 
three elements are generally present when fraud occurs. Those elements are pressure, 
opportunity, and rationalization.”). 
 230. Id.  
 231. Morales et al., supra note 19, at 175; cf. Schuchter & Levi, Beyond the Fraud Triangle,  
supra note 62, at 184 (“Contrary to findings in the literature and the previously mentioned 
international fraud standards, we found that only opportunity is (perhaps tautologically) 
mandatory for committing a white-collar crime, according to our interviewed offenders.”). 
 232. See, e.g., Dina Pomeranz, No Taxation Without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement 
in the Value Added Tax, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2539, 2540 (2015) (finding evidence in a study of 
Chilean VAT enforcement that a paper trail deters tax evasion); Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, User-
Friendly Taxpaying, 92 IND. L.J. 1509, 1534 (2017) (“The most obvious upside of information 
reporting is the clear deterrence benefit: income that is reported to the IRS by third parties is all 
but impossible for taxpayers to conceal without detection.”); Morse et al., supra note 196, at 37 
(“Underpayment of tax on business income is commonly attributed to the receipt of cash.”).  
 233. See generally Leandra Lederman & Joseph C. Dugan, Information Matters in Tax Enforcement, 
2020 BYU L. REV. 145 (analyzing the importance of third-party reporting).  
 234. The taxpayer whose taxes were withheld could still cheat on the tax return with respect 
to the income subject to withholding or with respect to other items. However, the paper trail 
accompanying the withheld amounts reduces the opportunity to cheat. IRS statistics show a 99 
percent compliance rate with respect to items subject to information reporting and withholding 
(that is, wages and salaries). IRS, PUB. 1415 (REV. 5-2016), FEDERAL TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: 
TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008–2010, at 12 chart 1 (2016) [hereinafter IRS, TAX GAP 
ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008–2010], https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/p1415.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/MU85-JQ64]. With respect to other amounts, cash income generally faces the most 
evasion. A taxpayer with only wage income could invent deductions or credits, but those involve 
affirmatively including items on the return, rather than omitting an item. Taxpayers may be less 
likely to affirmatively lie than to lie by omission. See Jay A. Soled & Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, 
Regulating Tax Return Preparation, 58 B.C. L. REV. 152, 196–97 (2017) (“As various psychological 
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(but increasing the opportunity for the withholding agent to abscond with 
it).235 Third-party reporting involves a paper trail that makes the payment 
visible to the tax authority: Both the tax administration and the taxpayer 
receive an information report containing the amount paid and other 
information, including the amount of any tax withheld.236 The taxpayer could 
omit from the return the amount included in the information report, but 
simple document matching would likely detect it.237 That obvious transparency 
should deter tax evasion. And, in fact, IRS statistics support the intuitive 
notion that, as the information the IRS has about an income item decreases, 
voluntary compliance also decreases: 
 
Type of Income 
Estimated Voluntary 
Compliance Rate238 
“Income subject to substantial information 
reporting and withholding” 
99% 
“Income subject to substantial information 
reporting” 95% 
“Income subject to some information 
reporting” 
83% 




The relationships among these figures have been consistent over time.239 
The IRS has therefore observed that “[f]or the individual income tax, 
 
studies confirm, an act of omission (like failing to report income) costs individuals very little 
mental energy compared to an act of commission (like robbing a bank). . . . Forcing taxpayers to 
affirmatively lie on their return if they want to omit tax obligations should make them more 
reluctant to do so and thereby increase compliance.” (footnotes omitted)). Items listed on the 
return are also easier for the IRS to audit. See Colony, Inc. v. Comm’r, 357 U.S. 28, 36 (1958) 
(explaining, in the context of an extended statute of limitations, that “a taxpayer’s omission to 
report some taxable item[] [puts] the Commissioner . . . at a special disadvantage in detecting 
errors”). 
 235. The withheld taxes constitute “trust fund taxes” that the withholding agent could fail to 
pay over. This issue is discussed in supra text accompanying notes 205–09. 
 236. See Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in Tax 
Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 697 (2007) [hereinafter Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps]. This 
also simplifies compliance for the taxpayer. Thomas, supra note 232, at 1534 (“An enormous 
advantage of information reporting for taxpayers is that it is essentially equivalent to 
recordkeeping by the third parties that report the income.”). 
 237. Jim Buttonow, The New IRS “Audit”: Upfront Information-Statement Matching, H&R BLOCK 
(May 17, 2017), https://www.hrblock.com/tax-center/newsroom/irs/upfront-information-
statement-matching [https://perma.cc/78ZZ-UHWH]. 
 238.  See IRS, PUB. 1415 (REV. 9-2019), FEDERAL TAX COMPLIANCE RESEARCH: TAX GAP 
ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2011–2013, at 14 fig.3 (2019) [hereinafter IRS, TAX GAP ESTIMATES 
FOR TAX YEARS 2011–2013], https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1415.pdf [https://perma.cc/C7LF-
K753] (showing noncompliance rates). 
 239. Compare, e.g., IRS, TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008–2010, supra note 234, at 12 
chart 1 (showing estimated noncompliance rates for the categories of income in the table above, 
which translate to voluntary compliance rates of 99%, 93%, 81%, and 37%), with IRS, TAX GAP 
FOR TAX YEAR 2006, at 3 chart 1 (2012), https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/overview_tax_ 
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reporting compliance is far higher when income items are subject to 
information reporting and even higher when also subject to withholding.”240 
Although these IRS statistics do not prove causation, empirical studies of 
the question generally have found that third-party information reporting 
increases reporting of income.241 Thus, opportunity is a critical factor in tax 
noncompliance, just as it is in the fraud triangle. 
C. RATIONALIZATION 
The fraud triangle’s third factor is “rationalization.” Cressey explained 
that: 
[T]he potential trust violator . . . defines the relationship between 
the non-shareable problem and the illegal solution in language 
which enables him to look upon trust violation (a) as essentially non-
criminal, (b) as justified, or (c) as a part of a general irresponsibility 
for which he is not completely accountable.242 
Scholars have developed typologies of rationalizations, synthesizing decades 
of prior research that, aside from Cressey’s work, took off with a 1957 article 
by Gresham Sykes and David Matza on juvenile delinquents.243 Sykes and 
Matza set forth what has since been termed the “Famous Five Neutralizations” 
that they found offenders used to rationalize their actions.244 Since then, 
 
gap_2006.pdf [https://perma.cc/ST82-HR8E] (reflecting estimated voluntary compliance rates 
of 99%, 92%, 89%, and 44%). 
 240. IRS, TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2011–2013, supra note 238, at 13. 
 241. See, e.g., Todd Kumler, Eric Verhoogen & Judith A. Frías, Enlisting Employees in Improving 
Payroll-Tax Compliance: Evidence from Mexico 21–22 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Rsch., Working Paper 
No. 19385, 2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/w19385.pdf [https://perma.cc/2XLT-MLCM] 
(finding that a pension reform in Mexico that linked younger workers’ pensions more closely to 
reported wages and allowed those workers to monitor their reported wages reduced firms’ payroll 
tax evasion with respect to younger workers); Joana Naritomi, Consumers as Tax Auditors, 109 AM. 
ECON. REV. 3031, 3052, 3069–70 (2019) (finding that the implementation of a “receipt lottery” 
and online access for consumers to check reported amounts increased São Paulo, Brazil retailers’ 
reported revenues by at least 21 percent over four years); Junmin Wan, The Incentive to Declare 
Taxes and Tax Revenue: The Lottery Receipt Experiment in China, 14 REV. DEV. ECON. 611, 617 (2010) 
(finding that the introduction of a receipt lottery in certain Chinese provinces increased retailers’ 
sales tax payments in those provinces by 21.5–24.2 percent). 
 242. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 93. 
 243. Gresham M. Sykes & David Matza, Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of Delinquency, 22 
AM. SOCIO. REV. 664, 667–69 (1957); see Shadd Maruna & Heith Copes, What Have We Learned 
from Five Decades of Neutralization Research?, in 32 CRIME & JUSTICE 221, 222 (Michael Tonry ed., 
2005) (“The study of offender verbalizations as ‘data’ in criminology might have originated with 
Cressey’s (1953) study of embezzlers’ excuses, but it has since become associated primarily with 
Gresham Sykes and David Matza’s (1957) article, ‘Techniques of Neutralization: A Theory of 
Delinquency.’”); id. at 223 (“[S]omewhat oddly for a theory based on juvenile delinquency, 
[neutralization theory] has found its most receptive audience in studies of organizational and 
white-collar crime.”). 
 244. Maruna & Copes, supra note 243, at 231. These five neutralizations are “denial of 
responsibility, denial of injury, denial of the victim, condemnation of condemners, and the 
appeal to higher loyalties.” Id. They are explained in more detail below.  
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other scholars have expanded on that list.245 For example, in 2003, Blake 
Ashforth and Vikas Anand added three more rationalization techniques to 
the list.246  
In 2004, Anand et al. reduced Ashforth and Anand’s expanded list to “six 
tactics that [they] believe are most commonly used in organizations” as 
justifications for corrupt behavior.247 These factors are: (1) “Denial of 
responsibility” (“The actors engaged in corrupt behaviors perceive that they 
have no other choice than to participate in such activities.”); (2) “Denial of 
injury” (“The actors are convinced that no one is harmed by their actions; 
hence the actions are not really corrupt.”); (3) “Denial of victim” (“The actors 
counter any blame for their actions by arguing that the violated party deserved 
whatever happened.”); (4) “Social weighting” (“The actors assume two 
practices that moderate the salience of corrupt behaviors: 1. Condemn the 
condemner, 2. Selective social comparison.”); (5) “Appeal to higher loyalties” 
(“The actors argue that their violation of norms is due to their attempt to 
realize a higher-order value.”); and (6) “Metaphor of the ledger” (“The actors 
rationalize that they are entitled to indulge in deviant behaviors because of 
their accrued credits (time and effort) in their jobs.”).248 
Rationalizations can certainly come into play in the tax context. For 
example, the owner of a failing business who fails to pay over “trust fund taxes” 
could rationalize that this is the only way to save the business—which will help 
employees keep their jobs and will give rise to increased tax payments in the 
future from both the employees and the business once it is successful again. 
This is an example of an “appeal to higher loyalties” in the terminology of 
 
 245. Id. (“The subsequent expansion of the theory to different types of offenders and 
offenses has led to the ‘discovery’ of several new neutralization techniques. Schönbach (1990) 
devoted nearly an entire book to cataloging the different accounts that individuals offer for their 
actions.”). 
 246. Blake E. Ashforth & Vikas Anand, The Normalization of Corruption in Organizations,  
25 RSCH. ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. 1, 17 (2003) (“There appear to be at least eight types of 
rationalizations, five of which . . . were identified by Sykes and Matza (1957).” (citation omitted)). 
 247. Vikas Anand, Blake E. Ashforth & Mahendra Joshi, Business as Usual: The Acceptance and 
Perpetuation of Corruption in Organizations, 19 ACAD. MGMT. EXEC., Nov. 2005, at 9, 11.  
 248. Id. at 11 tbl.1. The Anand et al. article also discusses each rationalization in more detail 
under a subheading named for the rationalization. See id. at 11–14.  
  For more recent work discussing most of these rationalizations, along with “Claim of 
Entitlement” and “Claim of Relative Acceptability/Normality,” see, for example, Todd Haugh, 
The Criminalization of Compliance, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1215, 1255–59 (2017) (discussing 
“eight of the most prominent rationalizations used by white collar and corporate offenders”); 
Haugh, supra note 199, at 1218–22 (exploring “eight of the most prominent rationalizations used 
by white collar criminals”); and Todd Haugh, Sentencing the Why of White Collar Crime, 82 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 3143, 3165–69 (2014) (“identif[ying] eight neutralization techniques employed by white 
collar criminals”). 
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Anand et al.249 The owner could also rationalize that the nonpayment is only 
a “loan” that will soon be repaid.250 This is an example of “denial of injury.”251 
In the individual income tax context, Tackett et al. argue that “[t]he 
overwhelming rationalization used in tax evasion is the lack of equity in the 
tax system. The lack of equity rationalization manifests itself along three 
dimensions: uneven tax burden, fiscal irresponsibility by the government, and 
lack of enforcement.”252 That is, Tackett et al. argue that taxpayers may 
rationalize that (1) they are making up for tax breaks that others (e.g., the 
rich) get; (2) “governmental misspending or corruption justifies cheating on 
tax payments”; and (3) “[t]he lack of enforcement of the tax laws places an 
unfair burden on honest taxpayers.”253 These categories of rationalizations 
might be paraphrased as (1) self help (creating one’s own tax break); (2) an 
eye for an eye (a response to perceived governmental misspending or other 
inadequacies); and (3) refusal to be a chump (because cheaters are routinely 
not caught, the compliant pay more than everyone else).  
The first type of rationalization, self help, focuses on the idea that others, 
particularly the rich, have access to tax shelters and tax breaks that the 
rationalizer does not. That rationalization may be fueled by stories about 
loopholes exploited by the well-advised.254 This appears to be an example of 
“social weighting” in the terminology of Anand et al.255 
The second type of rationalization—the eye-for-an-eye approach, which 
justifies evasion by pointing to government wastefulness or corruption—is a 
form of quid pro quo. In the typology of Anand et al., this falls within “denial 
of victim,” which can take the form of the classic justification, “[t]hey deserved 
it.”256 This type of justification may be used by illegal tax protestors.257 
The third form of rationalization is refusal to be the only “chump” who 
is honest. In this regard, Tackett et al. argue: 
 
 249. See Anand et al., supra note 247, at 11 tbl.1 (giving as example rationalization of this 
type: “We answered to a more important cause.”).  
 250. See Am. Bar Ass’n Comm’n on Taxpayer Compliance, supra note 208, at 367 (“It is 
tempting for the business owner in such desperate straits to view employee tax withholdings as 
an interest-free loan that will be paid back once business turns around.”). 
 251. See Anand et al., supra note 247, at 11 tbl.1 (giving as example rationalization of this 
type: “No one was really harmed.”). 
 252. Tackett et al., supra note 197, at 656.  
 253. Id.  
 254. For an example of this type of news story, see Emily Stewart, America’s Getting $10 Trillion 
in Tax Cuts, and 20% of Them Are Going the Richest 1%, VOX (July 11, 2018, 11:50 AM), https:// 
www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/7/11/17560704/tax-cuts-rich-san-francisco-fed. 
 255. See Anand et al., supra note 247, at 11 tbl.1 (giving as an example rationalization: 
“Others are worse than we are.”).  
 256. Id. 
 257. See Danshera Cords, Tax Protestors and Penalties: Ensuring Perceived Fairness and Mitigating 
Systemic Costs, 2005 BYU L. REV. 1515, 1518 (“Individuals who are dissatisfied with the government 
and its policies are more likely to be convinced that the tax system is illegitimate than are 
individuals who are satisfied with the government and its policies.”). 
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Many individuals believe (correctly) that tax evasion is widespread 
and goes unpunished in the vast majority of cases. The lack of 
enforcement of the tax laws places an unfair burden on honest 
taxpayers. Accordingly, tax evaders reason that evasion is their only 
option to obtain relief from an unjust tax system.258  
This also may be a form of “social weighting,”259 but it focuses on the zero-sum 
game aspect of taxpaying because evading taxes raises the tax cost for 
everyone else. The “chump” rationalization highlights the importance of 
enforcement of the tax laws to sustaining norms of tax compliance.260 In other 
words, non-enforcement “sends a signal . . . that others do not wish to enforce 
the tax laws and that tax evasion is in some sense socially acceptable, and the 
social norm of compliance disappears.”261 
Taxpayers may use other rationalizations, as well. For example, they may 
rationalize that they need the money more than the government, that the 
government will never miss the money, or that they overpaid in a previous 
year and this will right that wrong. Whatever the rationalization, applying this 
fraud triangle element to tax evasion is helpful in understanding the dynamics 
of tax evasion. 
V. POTENTIAL IMPLICATIONS FOR TAX COMPLIANCE MODELS 
As noted at the beginning of this Article, the traditional economic model 
of tax compliance is the deterrence model, while, more recently, the literature 
has considered behavioral explanations for compliance.262 Some scholars 
have suggested that these theories are in tension with each other.263 Yet, there 
 
 258. Tackett et al., supra note 197, at 656. 
 259. See Anand et al., supra note 247, at 11 tbl.1.  
 260. See generally Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax 
Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453 (2003) [hereinafter Lederman, Interplay] (synthesizing the 
experimental and empirical evidence and arguing tax enforcement buttresses tax compliance 
norms and can help tip a noncompliance norm in a community to a compliance norm); see also 
Lederman, supra note 2, at 653 (arguing that “[a] 2009 study of individuals from the neighboring 
countries of Botswana and South Africa supports the idea that enforcement efforts are more 
effective where compliance norms are stronger” (footnote omitted) (citing Ronald G. Cummings, 
Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Michael McKee & Benno Torgler, Tax Morale Affects Tax Compliance: 
Evidence from Surveys and an Artefactual Field Experiment, 70 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 447, 447 
(2009))). 
 261. James Alm & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Institutions, Paradigms, and Tax Evasion in 
Developing and Transition Countries, in PUBLIC FINANCE IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL 
COUNTRIES 146, 151 (Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & James Alm eds., 2003) (adding that “[s]uch an 
outcome is common in many countries, such as the Philippines and Italy”). 
 262. See supra text accompanying notes 1–3. 
 263. See, e.g., Cummings et al., supra note 260, at 449 (“[E]xtreme . . . risk aversion would be 
required to explain observed . . . compliance [under the deterrence model]. Other factors must 
be at work.”); Richard Lavoie, Flying Above the Law and Below the Radar: Instilling a Taxpaying Ethos 
in Those Playing by Their Own Rules, 29 PACE L. REV. 637, 642 (2009) (“Because the deterrence 
model fails to accurately predict tax evasion levels, other forces must be influencing citizens to 
comply despite the apparently overwhelming economic utility of cheating.”); Eric A. Posner, Law 
and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1782 (2000) (stating that “[a] 
widespread view among tax scholars holds that law enforcement does not explain why people pay 
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is no reason that deterrence and behavioral factors cannot both positively 
influence tax compliance. Studies generally find that audits and audit threats 
have a strong positive effect on compliance,264 and that behavioral factors 
such as norms appeals265 have at least some positive effect.266 This Part argues 
 
taxes” and advocating for a signaling model of tax compliance); Alex Raskolnikov, Crime and 
Punishment in Taxation: Deceit, Deterrence, and the Self-Adjusting Penalty, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 569, 
577–79 (2006) (“If the economic analysis does not fully explain tax compliance, what does? 
Perhaps, looking at human beings as more than mere ‘rational rats’ may provide the answer.  
. . . Clearly, more experimental results would be helpful in resolving theoretical debates. In the 
meantime, the best one can do . . . is to explicitly ground any proposal aimed at improving tax 
administration in one of the competing views about taxpayer behavior.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 264. See, e.g., Liucija Birskyte, Effects of Tax Auditing: Does the Deterrent Deter?, 8 RSCH. J. ECON., 
BUS. & ICT, no. 2, 2013, at 1, 5 (finding that “[a] 1% increase in federal audit rate, on the average, 
increases individual income state tax collected per return by 1.74 dollars, holding other variables 
constant” (emphasis added)); Henrik Jacobsen Kleven, Martin B. Knudsen, Claus Thustrup 
Kreiner, Søren Pedersen & Emmanuel Saez, Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence from a Tax Audit 
Experiment in Denmark, 79 ECONOMETRICA 651, 689 (2011) (concluding in part that “[f]or self-
reported income, . . . tax evasion is substantial and responds negatively to an increase in the 
perceived probability of detection coming from either a prior audit or a threat-of-audit letter”); 
cf. OFF. OF MGMT. & BUDGET, APPENDIX, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL 
YEAR 2016, at 1035 (2015), https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/BUDGET-2016-APP/pdf/ 
BUDGET-2016-APP.pdf [https://perma.cc/SA3D-HYMV] (referring to “the indirect revenue 
effect of the deterrence value of [IRS tax] enforcement investments, which is estimated to be at 
least three times the direct revenue impact”). 
  Studies generally find that penalties have a positive but smaller effect than audits on tax 
payments. See Lederman, supra note 2, at 660–66 (summarizing studies). 
 265. See, e.g., Lucia Del Carpio, Are the Neighbors Cheating? Evidence from a Social Norm 
Experiment on Property Taxes in Peru 31 (Nov. 12, 2013) (unpublished paper), https:// 
www.econ.ku.dk/Kalender/seminarer/18022014/Carpio.Are_the_neighbors_cheating_Nov12.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/ENR6-8HLA] (“Disclosing the true rate of (previous) compliance has a large 
significant positive impact on compliance (20% relative to the control group). The payment 
reminder, however, can explain almost half of this increase.”); STEPHEN COLEMAN, MINN. DEP’T 
OF REVENUE, THE MINNESOTA INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE EXPERIMENT: STATE TAX RESULTS 18 
(1996), https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/4827/1/MPRA_paper_4827.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
E7AL-6PAJ] (finding in a study of Minnesota taxpayers that “Letter 2 [the norms letter] . . . had 
a moderately significant effect on the entire sample and a stronger effect within a large subgroup 
of taxpayers”); Michael Wenzel, Misperceptions of Social Norms About Tax Compliance: From Theory to 
Intervention, 26 J. ECON. PSYCH. 862, 877–78 (2005) (“When taxpayers were informed about the 
inconsistency between their own tax ethics and those attributed to other people, they claimed 
fewer non-WRE [work-related expense] deductions compared to taxpayers who had not received 
that information. However, no effect emerged for WRE claims, even though survey questions and 
feedback intervention explicitly referred to these.”). But cf. Marsha Blumenthal, Charles Christian 
& Joel Slemrod, Do Normative Appeals Affect Tax Compliance? Evidence from a Controlled Experiment in 
Minnesota, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 125, 132 (2001) (describing “Letter2 (Join the Compliant Majority)” 
and not finding a statistically significant effect in a study using the same Minnesota data as 
Stephen Coleman). 
 266. Other behavioral factors may have an effect, as well. For example, there are several 
studies examining the effect of procedural fairness or procedural justice on tax compliance. See, 
e.g., Martina Hartner, Silvia Rechberger, Erich Kirchler & Alfred Schabmann, Procedural Fairness 
and Tax Compliance, 38 ECON. ANALYSIS & POL’Y 137, 149–50 (2008) (“Overall, and despite the 
limitations of the findings in terms of extrapolatibility, the analysis shows a clear direct effect of 
procedural justice on motivational postures with all three samples.”); Kristina Murphy, Procedural 
Justice and Tax Compliance, 38 AUSTL. J. SOC. ISSUES 379, 384 (2003) (studying “why the majority 
of [certain tax] scheme investors reacted in such a negative way to the ATO’s [Australian 
Taxation Office] handling of the issue”); Michael Wenzel, The Impact of Outcome Orientation and 
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that the fraud triangle’s framework is a useful lens for bringing together 
multiple theories on tax compliance motivations. 
A. THE DETERRENCE MODEL AND THE FRAUD TRIANGLE 
As is well known in the tax compliance literature, under the deterrence 
model of tax compliance, the taxpayer compares the cost of compliance with 
the expected cost of evasion.  
For example, a taxpayer who omits from income an amount 
resulting in understated tax of $1000 and who faces a 1% chance of 
audit that will detect the evasion and a 20% penalty in addition  
to the tax if detected ($1200 in total), faces an “expected” 
(probabilistic) cost of $12.267  
The model thus captures the probabilistic aspect of enforcement. This 
example also uses realistic audit and penalty rates for the U.S. federal income 
tax system.268 In the example, the expected cost of cheating of only $12 
contrasts with the much higher cost of $1,000 if the taxpayer fully complies 
with the tax laws with respect to the income in question. This provides a 
financial incentive to cheat.269 
1. The Fraud Triangle’s “Incentive or Pressure” Prong 
Recall that the first prong of the fraud triangle is incentive or pressure 
(usually financial in nature).270 Incentive is a key component of deterrence,271 
 
Justice Concerns on Tax Compliance: The Role of Taxpayers’ Identity, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCH. 629, 639 
(2002) (finding that “[n]oncompliance with regard to income reporting and tax minimization 
was exclusively predicted by self-interest variables, whereas noncompliance in reporting of extra 
income as well as deduction claims was additionally influenced by identification and, interacting 
with identification, perceptions of justice”). 
 267. Lederman, supra note 2, at 642 (footnote omitted). The math is as follows:  
  0.01 * ($1,000 + [0.2 * $1,000]). 
 268. The standard U.S. federal tax penalty is 20 percent of the understated tax, on top of  
the tax due. I.R.C. § 6662(a)–(b) (2018) (imposing a 20 percent penalty for such things as 
negligence or substantial understatement of tax); cf. id. § 6663(a) (“If any part of any 
underpayment of tax required to be shown on a return is due to fraud, there shall be added to 
the tax an amount equal to 75 percent of the portion of the underpayment which is attributable 
to fraud.”). Currently, the IRS reports audit rates for U.S. individuals and corporations of less 
than one percent. See IRS, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK, 2019, at 35 tbl.17a (2020), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p55b.pdf [https://perma.cc/R9CE-4RJM] (stating that 0.15 
percent of individual tax returns and 0.06 percent of corporate returns were examined by the 
IRS for fiscal year 2018). Those rates have been declining over time. See id. at 35–43 tbl.17a. For 
example, in 2010, those rates were 1.01 percent and 1.55 percent, respectively. Id. at 43 tbl.17a. 
 269. See Lederman, supra note 2, at 644 (“Given these low levels of audit rates and penalties, 
it seems that a rational wealth-maximizing taxpayer should cheat whenever possible.”). 
 270. See supra text accompanying note 10. 
 271. Matthew McCaffrey, Incentives and the Economic Point of View: The Case of Popular Economics, 
1 REV. SOC. & ECON. ISSUES, Summer 2014, at 71, 72 (“[T]he incentive theory inspired by Gary 
Becker and many Chicago economists . . . introduced incentive thinking to behavior typically 
considered outside the scope of economics, creating fields such as the economics of . . . crime 
and punishment . . . .”). 
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so it fits very well with the economic deterrence model. For example, Brian 
Erard and Jonathan Feinstein start an article on tax compliance with the 
statement:  
In economic models of tax compliance it has traditionally been 
assumed that taxpayer reporting behavior is driven primarily by the 
incentives of the tax system. According to this framework, taxpayers 
choose how much income to report on their tax returns by solving a 
standard expected utility-maximization problem that trades off the 
tax savings from underreporting true income against the risks of 
audit and penalties for detected non-compliance.272 
In other words, as in the calculation above,273 the possibility of paying less 
to the government provides a financial incentive to evade one’s tax 
obligations.274 That incentive exists regardless of whether a taxpayer also faces 
financial pressures, although such pressures could increase the impulse to 
cheat.275  
From the perspective of the deterrence model, a context in which the 
expected value of cheating is higher than the expected value of complying 
fosters evasion.276 Mathematically, the incentive facing the taxpayer could be 
flipped to an incentive to comply by raising the expected cost of evasion to 
exceed the cost of compliance. For example, if the cost of compliance is 
$1,000, as in the example, but the expected cost of evasion were $1,100—due 
to the likelihood of detection and the magnitude of the penalty imposed on 
those caught cheating—the taxpayer’s incentive would be to comply.277 As this 
example shows, the first prong of the fraud triangle connects well with 
economic analysis of the tax compliance decision. 
 
 272. Brian Erard & Jonathan S. Feinstein, Honesty and Evasion in the Tax Compliance Game,  
25 RAND J. ECON. 1, 1 (1994) (emphasis added). The article advances the importance to tax 
policy of honest taxpayers who do not succumb to the financial incentive to cheat. Id. at 2. 
 273. See supra text accompanying notes 267–68.  
 274. See supra text accompanying note 228; cf. Robert R. Oliva & Roger W. Dorsey, From 
Colony to Home Concrete & Supply: Is Unrecovered Basis “Gross Income”? Extending the Statute of 
Limitations on Assessment from Three Years to Six Years, TAXES, Feb. 2013, at 49, 60 (2013) (applying 
the fraud triangle to the context of a sale of property, and stating, “all of us, as taxpayers, are 
motivated to maximize after-tax wealth”). 
 275. See supra Section IV.A.  
 276. Stephen W. Mazza, Taxpayer Privacy and Tax Compliance, 51 U. KAN. L. REV. 1065, 1066 
(2003) (“[T]he basic economic model of tax evasion, developed by Allingham and Sandmo  
. . . . predicts that a taxpayer will evade taxes when the expected gains from evasion, determined 
in part by the tax rate, exceed the expected value of the punishment, determined by the 
probability of detection and the resulting penalty if caught.” (footnote omitted)). 
 277. Although, in theory, the penalty could be made large enough that a small likelihood of 
detection—such as the one percent audit rate in the example—would provide an incentive to 
comply, studies have found that a greater likelihood of detection is much more effective at 
spurring compliance than higher penalties are. See Lederman, supra note 2, at 660–66 (summarizing 
studies). 
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2. The Fraud Triangle’s “Opportunity” Prong  
Under the basic economic model, at the realistic audit and penalty levels 
reflected in the example above,278 evasion appears much less costly than 
compliance, implying that the taxpayer would always choose evasion. Thus, 
the deterrence model would seem to predict zero compliance. Yet, we observe 
positive and even high compliance rates in the real world. For example, the 
IRS estimates an overall voluntary compliance rate of 81.7 percent with legal-
source income.279 Economists framed this as the tax compliance “puzzle,”280 
and numerous scholars have stated based on this superficial comparison that 
the deterrence model is incorrect.281  
Yet, this purported compliance “puzzle” ignores (among other things)282 
the issue of opportunity to evade.283 That is, simply comparing (relatively) low 
 
 278. See supra text accompanying notes 267–68.  
 279. IRS, TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008–2010, supra note 234, at 6–7. 
 280. See, e.g., James Alm, Isabel Sanchez & Ana de Juan, Economic and Noneconomic Factors in 
Tax Compliance, 48 KYKLOS 3, 3 (1995) (“[T]he puzzle of tax compliance is not so much ‘Why is 
there so much cheating?’ Instead, the real puzzle is ‘Why is there so little cheating?’” (emphasis 
added)); Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological Tax Contract: 
The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation, 29 LAW & POL’Y 102, 102 (2007) (“The puzzle of 
the economic theory of tax compliance is why people pay taxes.”); J.T. Manhire, There Is No Spoon: 
Reconsidering the Tax Compliance Puzzle, 17 FLA. TAX REV. 623, 630 (2015) (“[H]ow does one 
explain the relatively high voluntary compliance rate given the relatively low audit rate in the 
United States? This apparent difficulty is sometimes referred to as the ‘tax compliance puzzle.’”); 
Benno Torgler & Friedrich Schneider, The Impact of Tax Morale and Institutional Quality on the 
Shadow Economy, 30 J. ECON. PSYCH. 228, 230 (2009) (explaining “in many countries, the level of 
deterrence is too low to explain the high degree of tax compliance” and referring to the “puzzle 
of tax compliance”). 
 281. See, e.g., Frey, supra note 3, at 389 (“There is compelling evidence that the deterrence 
model, and therewith tax policy based on deterrence, is at best incomplete, and may even be 
wrong.”); MARC LEROY, L’IMPÔT, L’ÉTAT ET LA SOCIÉTÉ: LA SOCIOLOGIE FISCALE DE LA DÉMOCRATIE 
INTERVENTIONNISTE 241 (2010) (“Concernant le risque du contrôle fiscal, un fait important est 
que la fréquence moyenne de vérifications est en générale faible, et donc que le respect des 
obligations déclaratives devrait être plus faible qu’il n’est: cette observation contredit l’approche 
par la maximisation de l’utilité.” (meaning: “With respect to tax enforcement, an important fact 
is that the average audit rate generally is low, and so voluntary tax compliance should be lower 
than it actually is; this observation contradicts the utility-maximization approach.”) (translation 
by the author)); J. Manhire, Toward a Perspective-Dependent Theory of Audit Probability for Tax 
Compliance Models, 33 VA. TAX REV. 629, 629 (2014) (“The classic deterrence theory model of 
income tax evasion first articulated in 1972 has met significant criticism because it does not 
comport with the observed rate of tax compliance.”); Posner, supra note 263, at 1782 (“A 
widespread view among tax scholars holds that law enforcement does not explain why people pay 
taxes.”). 
 282. See Lederman, supra note 2, at 650–55 (summarizing factors missing from the basic 
deterrence model, including criminal penalties and the hassle of undergoing an audit).  
 283. See, e.g., Kleven et al., supra note 264, at 653 (“[O]ur findings suggest that tax evasion is 
low, not because taxpayers are unwilling to cheat, but because they are unable to cheat successfully 
due to the widespread use of third-party reporting.”); Lederman, supra note 2, at 646 (“While 
there is certainly room for civic commitments and respect for the law as explanations for some 
compliance, the lack of opportunity for tax evasion . . . explains much tax compliance and is 
consistent with the deterrence model.”); Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps, supra note 236, at 697 
(“An essential missing piece of this seeming puzzle is that the federal income tax law benefits 
from structural mechanisms that constrain payment with respect to the major sources of income 
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audit rates and penalties with (relatively) high compliance rates assumes that 
taxpayers have an open opportunity to cheat with respect to all items on the 
tax return—but that is not the case. There are at least two important ways in 
which the government restricts the opportunity to evade taxes. One involves 
a “structural system” and the other involves monitoring that is not included 
in audit statistics. 
A structural system is a built-in constraint that channels behavior, in 
contrast with rules that require monitoring of compliance. For example, a 
road can be structured to reduce speeding, such as by installing a speed 
bump.284 The speed bump is a form of structural deterrent. It contrasts with 
mere speed limits and posted signs, which do not structurally foster compliant 
behavior.  
Because structural systems impose constraints on behavior, they should 
require much less monitoring for compliance than does a law or rule without 
a constraining structure. In the tax law, withholding serves as a structural 
system.285 This system involves a third party (typically someone who is at arm’s 
length from the taxpayer), rather than a physical feature such as a speed 
bump, but it still helps to constrain the taxpayer’s compliance. The IRS 
estimates timely and voluntary tax payment with respect to income subject to 
withholding at 99 percent.286 
With respect to monitoring, some monitoring of taxpayers’ activities is 
not included in audit statistics.287 That includes some IRS contacts with the 
 
for many people, including wages and salaries.”); Joel Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves: The Economics 
of Tax Evasion, J. ECON. PERSPS., Winter 2007, at 25, 37 (“Line item by line item, there is a clear 
positive correlation between the rate of compliance and the presence of enforcement mechanisms 
such as information reports and employer withholding.”). 
 284. See Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps, supra note 236, at 696 (“[I]f the government seeks 
to reduce speeding in a residential neighborhood, instead of (or in addition to) imposing fines 
and ticketing speeders, it can construct roads in ways that help reduce speeding, such as making 
them narrow or winding, or including speed bumps.” (footnote omitted)). 
 285. Id. at 697–98. This structural system involves human beings who could, in theory, 
collude with the taxpayer. However, there are numerous incentives for the withholding agent to 
comply rather than colluding with the taxpayer. See Lederman & Dugan, supra note 233, at 199–202. 
 286. See supra text accompanying note 238; IRS, TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2011 
–2013, supra note 238, at 14 fig.3. 
 287. The National Taxpayer Advocate has explained: 
The IRS has several . . . types of compliance contacts with taxpayers that it does not 
consider to be “real” audits. These types of contacts, which I call “unreal” audits, 
include math error corrections, Automated Underreporter (AUR) (a document 
matching program), identity and wage verification, and Automated Substitute for 
Return (ASFR) (a non-filer program).  
 . . . . 
In fiscal year 2016 . . . , the IRS conducted slightly more than a million “real” audits, 
resulting in an audit rate of 0.7 percent. However, during the same timeframe, the 
IRS conducted approximately 8.5 million “unreal” audits. When adding these 
“unreal” audit numbers to the “real” ones, the IRS’s combined coverage rate jumps 
to over six percent. 
Nina E. Olson, NTA Blog: “Real” vs. “Unreal” Audits and Why This Distinction Matters, TAXPAYER 
ADVOC. SERV. (July 6, 2018), https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/news/nta-blog-real-vs-unreal-
audits-and-why-this-distinction-matters [https://perma.cc/Q7PM-PENQ]. 
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taxpayer.288 It also includes third-party information reporting. Third-party 
reporting is analogous to a technology such as a speed camera or red-light 
camera: It informs the government of the individual’s behavior, typically while 
also informing the individual that the government is watching.289 A taxpayer 
who receives $1,000 of interest or dividend or salary income generally cannot 
omit it and face a mere one percent chance of detection because third-party 
reporting (and possibly withholding) makes the payment transparent to the 
IRS. “Information returning matching can be viewed as an invisible audit 
—but it is not counted in audit rate statistics.”290  
The fraud triangle’s second factor is perceived opportunity—which, in the 
tax context, is perceived opportunity to evade. Although IRS matching of 
information returns with taxpayer returns may not occur 100 percent of the 
time, the taxpayer’s perceived opportunity to evade decreases dramatically in 
the presence of third-party reporting. The IRS estimates timely and voluntary 
tax payment with respect to income subject to complete third-party 
information reporting (but not withholding) at a very high rate—95 
percent.291 The fraud triangle’s focus on perceived opportunity helps highlight 
the importance of taxpayer perception to tax noncompliance. 
In applying the fraud triangle’s “opportunity” prong to tax evasion, 
Tackett et al. provide the following analogy: 
Suppose a department store operated on the honor system, in which 
customers selected merchandise, tallied their bill, and remitted their 
payment without any supervision other than a 1 percent chance of 
being audited. Assume further that customers who are caught 
cheating are almost never prosecuted, but merely have to pay the 
accurate amount of their purchase along with a modest financial 
penalty. How long would such a store remain in business? The 
scenario is analogous to the federal income tax system.292 
This is an interesting analogy, but it reflects the same trap that scholars 
who only look at audits and penalties when evaluating the deterrence model 
fall into: It is apt only for amounts not subject to third-party reporting. 
Imagine if this hypothetical store also had a department with all of its 
merchandise in locked cases, where a salesperson had to take the 
merchandise and an invoice to a cashier to await customer payment. That 
department would no doubt experience much less nonpayment, just as items 
subject to third-party information reporting do.293 The locked case is a 
structural system, analogous to withholding, and the accompanying person 
 
 288. Id.  
 289. See Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps, supra note 236, at 696.  
 290. Lederman, Reformed IRS, supra note 209, at 975.  
 291. See supra text accompanying note 238; IRS, TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2011 
–2013, supra note 238, at 11 tbl.2. 
 292. Tackett et al., supra note 197, at 656. 
 293. See supra text accompanying note 238. 
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essentially provides information reporting, reducing the perceived opportunity 
for malfeasance.  
Thus, two of the three fraud triangle factors—incentive or pressure  
and perceived opportunity—align nicely with the deterrence model of tax 
compliance. The third factor, rationalization, fits better with behavioral 
theories of tax compliance, as discussed in the next Section. 
B. BEHAVIORAL APPROACHES TO TAX COMPLIANCE AND THE FRAUD  
TRIANGLE’S “RATIONALIZATION” PRONG  
While deterrence has been shown empirically to positively affect tax 
compliance,294 it is not the only positive influence. Behavioral factors also 
matter. As a simple example, risk aversion is a behavioral factor that is often 
discussed in connection with the basic economic model of tax compliance.295 
Risk aversion increases deterrence under the basic economic model.296 This 
example shows that a behavioral element need not be considered inconsistent 
with economic modeling of tax compliance.  
Thus, considering a prong of the fraud triangle other than the two 
discussed above in connection with the deterrence model—incentive or pressure 
and perceived opportunity—does not undermine those two prongs. The fraud 
triangle’s third factor, rationalization, is focused on the psychological aspects 
of the violation and thus fits well with behavioral theories. This Section focuses 
on two frequently discussed behavioral theories, social norms and tax morale 
sourced in trust in government, to show how the rationalization prong of the 
fraud triangle sheds light on them.  
1. Norms of Compliance or Noncompliance 
Several scholars have studied the effects on tax compliance of normative 
appeals.297 Such appeals generally take the form of a letter from the tax 
authority touting the community’s high level of compliance.298 As noted 
 
 294. See supra note 264 and accompanying text (discussing the effectiveness of audits and 
audit threats); see also supra text accompanying notes 233–41 (discussing the role of third-party 
reporting). 
 295. See, e.g., Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 1, at 327 (including risk aversion in original 
economic model of tax compliance); James Andreoni, Brian Erard & Jonathan Feinstein, Tax 
Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LITERATURE 818, 823 (1998) (including taxpayer risk aversion in a basic 
economic model of compliance).  
 296. Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 1, at 329 (“[W]hen actual income varies, the fraction 
declared increases, stays constant or decreases . . . as relative risk aversion is an increasing, 
constant or decreasing function of income.”). 
 297. See, e.g., Blumenthal et al., supra note 265, at 129 (describing “Letter2: Join the 
Compliant Majority”); John Hasseldine, Peggy Hite, Simon James & Marika Toumi, Persuasive 
Communications: Tax Compliance Enforcement Strategies for Sole Proprietors, 24 CONTEMP. ACCT. RSCH. 
171, 178 (2007) (reporting on a study that included in one letter both a norms-based appeal and 
moral suasion); Wenzel, supra note 265, at 871 (surveying taxpayers and reporting survey results 
in a letter). 
 298. See, e.g., Blumenthal et al., supra note 265, at 129 (“The middle paragraph [of Letter 2] 
stated that IRS audits show that ‘people who file tax returns report correctly and pay voluntarily 
93 percent of the income taxes they owe.’ It concluded, ‘Although some taxpayers owe money 
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above, some studies show that appeals to compliance norms may have at least 
a modest positive effect on tax payments.299 Similarly, community norms of 
noncompliance may foster noncompliance.300 
The fraud triangle’s rationalization prong focuses on the psychology of 
the offender. Cressey explained that “rationalization,” in the sense in which 
he used the term, can “refer to a process of finding some logical excuse for 
questionable behavior tendencies, for thoughts as well as acts, and for 
decisions to perform an act.”301 Thus, rationalization allows the offender to 
mentally justify his or her actions, so as to minimize cognitive dissonance 
between a self-image as an honest person and the fraudulent action.302  
A knowledge of community norms of honesty may make rationalizations 
of tax evasion less effective. For example, if the taxpayer is credibly told that 
most community members comply with their tax obligations, that may make 
it harder for that person to justify evasion on the basis of bandwagon-type 
rationalizations such as “everyone does it.” Similarly, such an information 
campaign about compliance helps undermine neutralizations303 such as tax 
cheating is “not really wrong.”304 By contrast, norms of noncompliance may 
facilitate rationalizations that the violation is not really a crime, or not so bad, 
or required so as not to be the only chump paying full freight.305 Thus, 
community norms may hinder or facilitate rationalizations that help a 
taxpayer justify evasion. 
 
because of minor errors, a small number of taxpayers who deliberately cheat owe the bulk of 
unpaid taxes.’”); Wenzel, supra note 265, at 874 (quoting a letter to taxpayers: “These [survey] 
results indicate that we tend to think most people accept tax cheating and exaggerations in tax 
deductions. However, the truth is that most people think we should be honest with our tax 
statements and claim only those deductions that are allowable.”); cf. Hasseldine et al., supra note 
297, at 178 (describing letter combining elements of a normative appeal and moral suasion). 
 299. See supra note 265 and accompanying text. 
 300. See Lederman, Interplay, supra note 260, at 1470 (noting the possibility that “observing 
others’ noncompliance might change the observer’s moral standard so that he or she might feel 
less guilt in failing to comply”).  
 301. CRESSEY, OTHER PEOPLE’S MONEY, supra note 16, at 94 (footnotes omitted). 
 302. See supra notes 48–51 and accompanying text.  
 303. See Sykes & Matza, supra note 243, at 667 (“[T]he delinquent represents not a radical 
opposition to law-abiding society but something more like an apologetic failure, often more 
sinned against than sinning in his own eyes. We call these justifications of deviant behavior 
techniques of neutralization . . . .” (emphasis added)). 
 304. Anand et al., supra note 247, at 12. In the language of Anand, Ashforth, and Joshi, this 
rationalization is “denial of injury.” Id.; see supra note 248 (referring to other recent works that 
discuss rationalizations). 
 305. See supra text accompanying notes 258–61 (discussing these rationalizations). 
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Enforcement may also help foster compliance norms,306 perhaps because 
it signals that violators are punished.307 One study’s results suggest that 
enforcement may even be more effective where compliance norms are 
stronger.308 The fraud triangle framework supports that idea because it is 
harder to rationalize that one’s behavior is not illegal or does not matter to 
the government if the government is visibly enforcing the law. 
2. Taxpayer Views of Government  
Some taxpayers may use claimed government failures to justify tax 
noncompliance.309 For example, they may object to how tax revenues are 
spent. They may refuse to pay tax, or certain taxes, until government policies 
change.310 In a 1991 article, Kent Smith and Loretta Stalans listed “[t]hree 
[categories] of people [who] account for the majority of noncompliance with 
tax laws.”311 The category relevant here is “those who willfully engage in tax 
noncompliance because they perceive that their tax dollars are not being 
spent appropriately or that government authorities are not treating them or 
other taxpayers appropriately.”312  
As this may suggest, one way to view the taxpayer/government 
relationship is as a type of contract. For example, political scientist John T. 
Scholz has advanced a “contractarian” theory of tax compliance under which 
taxpayers factor in the government’s provision of public goods.313 European 
economists Lars Feld and Bruno Frey have referred to a “psychological tax 
 
 306. See Del Carpio, supra note 265, at 21 (finding that “[a]fter the municipal enforcement 
policy begins, . . . the effect of the norms treatment relative to the payment reminder increases 
almost two-fold . . . , and the difference between the two is marginally significant (p = 15%)” and 
arguing that this “points to an interesting complementarity between the norms treatment and the 
standard enforcement policy”).  
 307. See John T. Scholz, Contractual Compliance and the Federal Income Tax System, 13 WASH. U. 
J.L. & POL’Y 139, 192 (2003) (arguing that, under his contractarian model of tax compliance, 
“the critical function of the state’s tax enforcement power is to assure adaptive contractarians 
that other citizens will meet their contractual obligations, assuring the adaptive contractarian that 
he or she is not foolish in meeting these same obligations”); see also Lederman, Interplay, supra 
note 260, at 1499 (arguing, based on experimental evidence, that “[e]nforcement may therefore 
have the effect of deterring some people and increasing the robustness of a compliance norm for 
others by minimizing their exposure to tax evasion”). 
 308. See Cummings et al., supra note 260, at 448 (“[W]hile compliance does increase with 
enforcement effort, the effect is less in the country for which governance is less good.”); 
Lederman, supra note 2, at 658–59 (arguing that the study’s results show greater normative 
commitments to tax compliance in Botswana than the compared country, South Africa). 
 309. See supra text accompanying note 257. 
 310. See James Alm, Betty R. Jackson & Michael McKee, Fiscal Exchange, Collective Decision 
Institutions, and Tax Compliance, 22 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 285, 285 (1993). 
 311. Kent W. Smith & Loretta J. Stalans, Encouraging Tax Compliance with Positive Incentives: A 
Conceptual Framework and Research Directions, 13 LAW & POL’Y 35, 36 (1991).  
 312. Id. The other two categories Smith and Stalans identified were (1) subcultures where 
tax cheating is the norm, and (2) those making careless errors. Id. The first category relates to 
the norms discussion above. See supra Section V.B.1. The latter category does not involve fraud, 
the focus of this Article. 
 313. See Scholz, supra note 307, at 139–40. 
A3_LEDERMAN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/26/2021  4:05 PM 
2021] THE FRAUD TRIANGLE AND TAX EVASION 1203 
contract” between taxpayers and the government.314 Feld and Frey argued 
that “a steady reduction in tax compliance need not only be interpreted as a 
violation of the law, but also as taxpayers’ discontent with what they receive 
for their taxes.”315  
Others have different views. For example, Joshua Rosenberg has argued 
that the payment of taxes and the receipt of benefits are not very linked in 
most taxpayers’ minds, due to “the separation of the burdens of tax from the 
benefits of government.”316 Moreover,  
the benefits of taxes (that is, the receipt of government services) 
seem both small and unrelated to our actual tax payments. As the 
benefits of tax fade from consciousness, and as their burdens grow 
in prominence, we begin to perceive the taxes themselves as little 
more than undeserved and unduly painful punishments.317  
Studies generally have not found a significant effect on tax payments of letters 
sent to taxpayers that focus on the public goods the government provides.318 
While a decline in tax compliance could have many causes, including a 
reduction in the audit rate,319 taxpayer claims that they are protesting 
government wrongs could seem to suggest that “good government” measures 
would foster compliance. Feld and Frey argue that “[t]he[] bonds between 
taxpayers and the state represent the core of individual tax morale, and thus 
positively affect tax compliance.”320 Appropriate treatment of the citizenry 
should certainly be a government priority, but whether it results in increased 
 
 314. Feld & Frey, supra note 280, at 106 (“In the psychological tax contract, punishment still 
plays a role in order to provide deterrence. But the satisfaction of taxpayers with what they get 
from the other contract party, that is, the government, mainly influences their tax morale.”). 
 315. Id. at 107. 
 316. Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy, and How We Can 
Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV. 155, 171 (1996). 
 317. Id. 
 318. See, e.g., Barak Ariel, Deterrence and Moral Persuasion Effects on Corporate Tax Compliance: 
Findings from a Randomized Controlled Trial, 50 CRIMINOLOGY 27, 43–44, 58 (2012) (finding that a 
letter to Israeli corporations explaining “how tax dollars were allocated,” providing “[r]easons 
for paying taxes,” and highlighting the societal harm from not paying, resulted in a small but 
statistically significant effect in the direction of noncompliance with a Value Added Tax (VAT)); 
Blumenthal et al., supra note 265, at 128–32 (finding no statistically significant effects of a 
“Support Valuable Services” letter); Benno Torgler, Moral Suasion: An Alternative Tax Policy 
Strategy? Evidence from a Controlled Field Experiment in Switzerland, 5 ECON. GOVERNANCE 235, 240, 
249–51 (2004) (finding an insignificant effect on timely filing and payment in Trimbach, 
Switzerland, of a letter stating, “[i]f the taxpayers did not contribute their share, our commune 
with its 6226 inhabitants would suffer greatly. With your taxes you help keep Trimbach attractive 
for its inhabitants.”). But cf. Michael Chirico, Robert P. Inman, Charles Loeffler, John MacDonald 
& Holger Sieg, An Experimental Evaluation of Notification Strategies to Increase Property Tax Compliance: 
Free-Riding in the City of Brotherly Love, 30 TAX POL’Y & ECON. 129, 146–47 & tbl.5 (2016) (finding 
that a letter describing public services had a statistically significant effect at p < .05 on the 
subgroup of single-property owners). 
 319. See Lederman, supra note 2, at 693 (concluding, based on a synthesis of studies, that “at 
low audit rates such as those in the United States, the evidence suggests that increasing the audit 
rate would increase overall tax compliance” (emphasis omitted)). 
 320. Feld & Frey, supra note 280, at 103. 
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tax compliance is an empirical question. Different reforms may have different 
effects. For example, previous work found that there is some evidence that 
procedural fairness on the part of the tax collector increases tax payments,321 
but that there was no evidence that increased service by the tax collector did 
so.322  
Frey and other scholars have argued that “tax morale” is central to tax 
compliance.323 This term is generally used to refer to all intrinsic motivations 
to pay taxes.324 It contrasts with deterrence, which involves the extrinsic 
motivators of audits and penalties.325 Frey has pointed to trust in government 
as the principal source of tax morale, arguing that:  
Tax morale must be put in the general context of the relationship 
between citizen and the state: At the one extreme, there are 
exploitative governments ruling their people in an authoritarian  
or even dictatorial way. . . . At the other extreme, there are 
participatory governments in which the taxpayers as citizens can 
themselves determine for what purposes the revenues should be 
used.326  
While deterrence and behavioral theories of tax compliance can co-
exist,327 some have argued that deterrence, with its focus on extrinsic 
motivators, may reduce voluntary inclinations to comply, even to the point of 
increasing noncompliance.328 In this vein, Frey has argued in part that 
 
 321. See Lederman, Reformed IRS, supra note 209, at 996–1004 (synthesizing then-existing 
studies); see sources cited supra note 266 (citing additional studies). 
 322. See Lederman, Reformed IRS, supra note 209, at 992–96 (synthesizing then-existing 
studies). 
 323. See supra note 3 and accompanying text; see infra text accompanying note 326. Frey’s 
claims are strong and are countered in Lederman, supra note 2, at 642–55. 
 324. See, e.g., Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers Are Treated,  
3 ECON. GOVERNANCE 87, 88 (2002) (“[T]he existence of an intrinsic motivation to pay taxes  
. . . has sometimes been called ‘tax morale.’”); Frey, supra note 3, at 389 (arguing “that intrinsic 
motivation in the form of ‘tax morale’ is of substantial importance in explaining tax paying 
behaviour”). 
 325. See Torgler, supra note 318, at 236 (“When monitoring and penalties for 
noncompliance are intensified, individuals notice that extrinsic motivation has increased . . . .”). 
 326. Frey, supra note 3, at 389–90 (emphasis omitted); see also Bruno S. Frey, Punishment 
—and Beyond, 5 CONTEMP. ECON. 90, 92 (2011) [hereinafter Frey, Punishment—and Beyond] (“An 
unfair, inconsiderate way of treating taxpayers—punishing honest taxpayers by error—tends to 
undermine this tax morale.”); Bruno S. Frey & Benno Torgler, Tax Morale and Conditional 
Cooperation, 35 J. COMPAR. ECON. 136, 144 (2007) (“If taxpayers think they are in a better position 
to monitor and control politicians, their willingness to cooperate and pay taxes increases. 
Therefore, a higher degree of satisfaction with a country’s democratic institution should lead to 
higher tax morale.”); Feld & Frey, supra note 280, at 103 (“For that contract to be upheld, 
incentives such as rewards or punishment need to be provided, but loyalties and emotional ties 
that go well beyond transactional exchanges must be considered as well. These bonds between 
taxpayers and the state represent the core of individual tax morale, and thus positively affect tax 
compliance.”).  
 327. See supra notes 262–66 and accompanying text; see supra text accompanying notes 294–96.  
 328. See, e.g., Feld & Frey, supra note 280, at 104 (“Positive (rewards) or negative incentives 
(deterrence) play a role, but it cannot be taken for granted that they induce tax compliance 
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“deterrence imposed by the tax authority may crowd out individuals’ intrinsic 
willingness to conform to tax laws.”329 Similarly, Feld and Frey argued that 
“[t]wo opposite cases of treating taxpayers can be distinguished:  
(1) respectful treatment supporting, and possibly raising, tax morale; and  
(2) authoritarian treatment undermining tax morale.”330 However, there  
is little evidence that deterrence has a crowding-out effect that reduces 
voluntary compliance.331 Instead, there is strong evidence that deterrence, 
particularly the threat of audit, is very effective at increasing tax payments.332  
The lens of the fraud triangle suggests that a view that the government 
or tax system is unjust or inequitable may be part of the rationalization prong 
for some people. That is, it may allow people to justify not complying with tax 
obligations. Joshua Rosenberg has made an argument along these lines: 
At least a part of the reason we do not comply more fully with the 
tax laws is that we believe either taxes specifically, or government in 
general, is unfair. Also true, however, is exactly the opposite: an 
important reason we believe tax laws are unfair is that we do not comply more 
fully with those laws.333  
Rosenberg explains that tax evaders try to avoid the uncomfortable 
cognitive dissonance that would arise from thinking of oneself as both a law-
abiding citizen and as stealing from the government: “In order to allow 
themselves to maintain a positive sense of self, the ‘rational’ part of their 
minds develops an understanding of what they are doing and why they are 
doing it that allows them to perceive their tax evasion as consistent with being 
a good, honest citizen.”334 That “understanding” could take the form of a 
rationalization formulated any number of ways:  
Whether this rationalization takes the form of “knowing” that the tax 
system is unfair, or “knowing” that the government is bad and 
misguided, is less important than the fact that, regardless of how 
individuals explain their tax evasion behavior to themselves and 
others, that explanation is likely to be some ex post rationalization 
 
because they may also crowd out tax morale.”); Frey, Punishment—and Beyond, supra note 326, at 
92 (“The net effect of using punishment in an effort to establish legal behavior is 
counterproductive if the relative price effect of the punishment is smaller than the crowding-out 
effect.”); cf. Frey & Feld, supra note 280, at 107 (“The feeling of being controlled in a negative 
way, and being suspected of tax cheating, tends to crowd out the intrinsic motivation to act as an 
honorable taxpayer and, as a consequence, tax morale will fall.”). 
 329. Frey, supra note 3, at 391 (emphasis omitted). 
 330. Feld & Frey, supra note 280, at 107. 
 331. See Lederman, supra note 2, at 655–62 (synthesizing studies and reaching this conclusion).  
 332. See supra note 264 (citing sources).  
 333. Rosenberg, supra note 316, at 199 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). He adds, “It 
is doubtful that anyone would ever consciously acknowledge that she thinks taxes are unfair 
because (rather than so) she cheats on her own taxes, but an individual’s lack of awareness of such 
a reverse-intuitive causal link does not mean that no such link exists.” Id.  
 334. Id. at 200–01. 
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rather than some guiding vision that motivates the behavior of tax 
evasion.335  
If Rosenberg is right that, at least for some taxpayers, claimed inequitable 
behavior by the government is simply a rationalization for evading taxes, 
better behavior by the government likely would not forestall such evasion. 
Without an easy scapegoat, evasion might be harder to justify, but some 
taxpayers might find an alternate rationalization, such as “everyone is doing 
it” or “they’ll never miss the money.” Better government behavior also likely 
would not affect committed evaders.336 In terms of the fraud triangle, these 
may be the people who auditing standards describe as “possess[ing] an 
attitude, character, or set of ethical values that allow them knowingly and 
intentionally to commit a dishonest act.”337  
The normative implication of this analysis is that it does not make sense 
to make good-government measures the sole or principal means of 
attempting to improve tax compliance. Certainly the government should treat 
people fairly as a matter of principle. Procedural justice may foster tax 
compliance, as well.338 However, given taxpayers’ financial incentive to pocket 
tax dollars and the presence of evasion opportunities, the government should 
not only treat taxpayers fairly, it should also recognize the importance of both 
structural constraints on evasion and enforcement. Such an approach accords 
not just with intuition but also with the theoretical framework provided by the 
fraud triangle. Empirically, limiting the opportunity to evade and increasing 
the likelihood that evasion will be detected have very positive effects on tax 
compliance.339 
VI. CONCLUSION 
There is a significant literature on the fraud triangle, particularly in 
accounting journals. The AICPA also adopted a fraud triangle-based 
approach in what was then called SAS No. 99, “Consideration of Fraud in a 
Financial Statement Audit.” Some scholars have criticized the fraud triangle 
as having been inappropriately extended beyond Donald Cressey’s initial 
focus on embezzlers and similar trust violators. It is true that the fraud triangle 
has evolved over the years, and that, perhaps due to its origin in offender-
 
 335. Id. at 201. 
 336. Taxpayers may be conceptualized in three main categories: those who are always honest, 
those who will always try to cheat, and a vast majority whose behavior can be influenced. See Jon 
S. Davis, Gary Hecht & Jon D. Perkins, Social Behaviors, Enforcement, and Tax Compliance Dynamics, 
ACCT. REV., Jan. 2003, at 39, 40 (referring to “honest taxpayers, susceptible taxpayers, and 
evaders”); cf. Susan C. Morse, Tax Compliance and Norm Formation Under High-Penalty Regimes, 44 
CONN. L. REV. 675, 694 (2012) (referring to “determined evaders”). 
 337. CODIFICATION OF ACCT. STANDARDS & PROCS., Clarified Statements on Auditing 
Standards, AU-C § 240.A1 (AM. INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCTS. 2020); ISA 240, supra note 10, ¶ A1. 
 338. See supra text accompanying notes 321–27. 
 339. See supra text accompanying notes 238–39 (reporting IRS voluntary compliance 
estimates, which increase as the IRS receives more information about the transaction); see supra 
note 264 and accompanying text (citing research on the effectiveness of audits at decreasing tax 
evasion).  
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focused work, it does not focus much on society’s role in crime. However, 
Cressey’s factors were not simply adopted wholesale by the AICPA. Work  
by Steve Albrecht, the Treadway Commission, and others appears to have 
informed the development of the slightly different factors that are included 
in U.S. and international auditing standards.  
Although the fraud triangle has been well studied, it has largely been 
overlooked by tax law professors and only rarely applied to tax evasion. Yet, it 
provides a useful lens when considering the tax evasion decision from an 
offender perspective. Most notably, the fraud triangle supports the idea  
that perceived opportunity is a critical—though not the only—factor in tax 
evasion. The fraud triangle also supports the importance of the deterrence 
model while still recognizing the importance of behavioral factors on the tax 
evasion decision.  
Generally speaking, the triangle’s first two factors—incentive or pressure 
and perceived opportunity—may be thought of as in line with the deterrence 
model, while the third factor—rationalization—accords with behavioral 
theories of compliance. While increasing compliance norms may help limit 
convenient rationalizations for cheating (and likely more so than good-
government measures) structural systems constrain the opportunity to evade. 
In addition, enforcement actions reduce the incentive and opportunity to 
cheat, while buttressing compliance norms. The fraud triangle thus provides 
a useful frame for showing how traditional economic and behavioral theories 
can work together. The usefulness of the fraud triangle to the understanding 
of tax evasion also underscores the value of accounting literature and 
criminology to the study of tax compliance and evasion. 
 
